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INTRODUCTION

Fifteen years ago, Justice William Brennan wrote an article in
which he called upon state courts to "step into the breach" left by
what Brennan perceived to be the U.S. Supreme Court's retreat from
its commitment to the protection of individual rights. 1 Brennan urged
state supreme courts to seize control of the protection of constitutional
rights by looking to state constitutions as potentially more generous
guarantors of individual rights than the U.S. Constitution as construed
by the Burger Court. Brennan's article, which has been called the
"Magna Carta" of state constitutionalism,2 earned him the sobriquet
of "patron saint" of sta~e constitutional law3 and gave birth to a movement advocating state independence in constitutional decisionmaking.
Adherents of this "New Federalism" movement, 4 who include among
their number several distinguished state jurists5 and some prolific acaI. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REv. 489, 503 (1977) [hereinafter Brennan, State Constitutions]; see also William J,
Brennan, Jr., The Bill ofRights and the States: The Revival ofState Constitutions as Guardians of
Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535 (1986) [hereinafter Brennan, Bill of Rights].
2. Stewart G. Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35
RUTGERS L. REV. 707, 716 (1983).

3. Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet - Justice Brennan and the Theory of State Constitutional
Law, 15 HASTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 429, 429 (1988).
4. The movement has also been called the "New Judicial Federalism" to distinguish it from a
legislative program pushed during the Reagan Administration that was also called "New Federalism." The Reagan Administration program involved making changes in federal law designed
to reallocate governmental responsibilities from the federal to state governments. The New Federalism under discussion here is a state-initiated movement to achieve judicial rather than legislative independence from the federal government, and on a constitutional rather than
programmatic level.
S. Former Oregon Supreme Court Justice Hans Linde, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice
Shirley Abrahamson, New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Stewart Pollock, New York Court of
Appeals Judge Judith Kaye, and Washington Supreme Court Justice Robert Utter have been
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demics, 6 have produced a voluminous body of commentary studying
the decisions of state supreme courts, and exhorting them to greater
decisional independence.7 Judging from this literature, the advocates
of New Federalism are extraordinarily optimistic about the prospects
for state constitutional law achieving the independence and prominence necessary not only to meet Justice Brennan's challenge, but to
fulfi11 what they regard as the promise of a genuinely federal system of
government. 8
The recent retirement of Justices Brennan and Thurgood Marshall,
the last two liberals on the U.S. Supreme Court, 9 and the corresponding solidification during the 1990-1991 Term of the Court's conservative majority, make this an appropriate time to reconsider the
potential role of state constitutional law in American society. Are
state courts, as proponents of New Federalism contend, developing an
independent body of constitutional jurisprudence? If so, will state
courts assume the dominant role traditionally occupied by the
Supreme Court in articulating and protecting individual rights? If
not, can they assume such a role, and should they?
In this article, I approach these questions in two steps. First, I
examine the status of state constitutional law as it is practiced today. I
conclude that, contrary to the claims of New Federalism, state constitutional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and
essentially unintelligible pronouncements. I argue that the fundamental defect responsible for this state of affairs is the failure of state
among the most active contributors to the New Federalism literature. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence of State Constitutional Law, 63
TEXAS L. REV. 1141 (1985); Judith S. Kaye, Dual Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 399 (1987); Hans A. Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State
Courts, 18 GA. L. R.Ev. 165 (1984); Pollock, supra note 2; Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional
Law, the United States Supreme Court, and Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in
the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. R.Ev. 19 (1989).
6. Ronald K.L. Collins, Robert F. Williams, and Donald E. Wilkes, Jr. have been among the
more active expounders of New Federalism. Representative examples of their work include Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions - The Montana Disaster, 63 TEXAS L. R.Ev.
1095 (1985); Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., First Things Last: Amendomania and State Bills of Rights,
54 MISS. L.J. 223 (1984); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow: Legitimacy of
State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. R.Ev. 353 (1984).
7. For comprehensive bibliographies of the literature, both old and new, dealing with state
constitutional law, see DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 317-35 (Bradley D.
McGraw ed., 1985); TIM J. WATTS, STATE CONSfITUTIONAL LAW DEVELOPMENT: A BIBLIOGRAPHY (1991); Earl M. Maltz et al., Selected Bibliography on State Constitutional Law, 20
RUTGERS L.J. 1093 (1989).
8. See infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
9. Justice Blackmun is today often considered a liberal. This shows how times have changed.
During his early years on the Court he was considered a centrist, if not a conservative. See Philip
B. Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 265,
268.
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courts to develop a coherent discourse of state constitutional law that is, a language in which it is possible for participants in the legal
system to make intelligible claims about the meaning of state
constitutions.
Second, I analyze the reasons for the failure of state courts to develop such a discourse. After rejecting several frequently offered explanations, I conclude that the failure of state constitutional discourse
reflects a much deeper failure, a· failure of state constitutionalism itself.
The central premise of state constitutionalism is that a state constitution reflects the fundamental values, and ultimately the character, of
the people of the state that adopted it. This premise, however, cannot
serve as the foundation for a workable state constitutional discourse
because it is not a good description of actual state constitutions; it
embraces theoretical inconsistencies that undermine its value as a
framework for a coherent discourse; and it takes an obsolete and potentially dangerous view of the texture and focus of American national
identity.
Before turning to the analysis itself, I want to convey a better sense
of the problem I will be addressing by relating a story of sorts about
state constitutional law. It is a story that I believe describes the experience of a great many lawyers in this country.
Imagine that you are researching potential challenges that your client could make to a state law. You research federal constitutional law
and find that you have a potential argument under, let us say, the
Equal Protection Clause. But you soon find that the standard applied
by the federal courts - suppose rational basis review applies - is so
deferential that your federal claim is a guaranteed loser. Good lawyer
that you are, though, you recall that your state constitution also contains an equal protection clause. Perhaps, you think to yourself, the
state constitution offers more favorable possibilities for your client.
You now begin to research state constitutional law. What do you
find? One distinct possibility is that the state courts have held that the
state provision means exactly the same thing as the federal provision,
and that whatever analysis the federal courts use under the federal
Constitution is the analysis that should be used under the state constitution as well. 10 This result is unsatisfying, but at least it ends your
research. After confirming your conclusion, you abandon further state
constitutional research as unproductive - it adds nothing to your
case. If you mention the state constitution at all, it might be a pro
10. See infra notes 99-129 and accompanying text.
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forma citation just to remind the court of the dual nature of your
claim.
Now suppose you are luckier, and find that the state provision
either has never been construed, 11 or that the state supreme court has
held that the meaning of the state constitutional provision is not dependent on the meaning of the federal one. Perhaps you even find a
handful of cases in which the state courts have rejected the analogous
federal analyses and have reached results different from those that federal courts would reach. 12 Your heart is filled with hope. Although
you will not find your argument handed to you on a silver platter, you
at least have an opening, it seems, to craft an argument that the state
constitutional provision has a meaning more favorable to your client
than its federal counterpart.
You now get down to serious work. After all, you know how to
"do" constitutional law. You will comb the state decisions to unearth
the relevant history of the provision at issue. You will figure out
which framers of the state constitution the state supreme court considers influential, and you will discover useful tidbits concerning their
constitutional philosophy. You will ferret out from state supreme
court decisions broad language about the history, purpose, structure,
and political theory of the state constitution. You will then weave
these materials together into a coherent and convincing story about
the state constitution, perhaps contrasting it with the familiar stories
of the federal Constitution. This story will form the basis for your
state constitutional claim on behalf of your client.
When you undertake this research, here is what you are likely to
find. After reading dozens of state constitutional decisions, you have
absolutely no sense of the history of the state constitution. You do not
know the identity of the founders, their purposes in creating the constitution, or the specific events that may have shaped their thinking.
You find nothing in the decisions indicating how the various provisions of the document fit together into a coherent whole, and if you do
find anything at all it is a handful of quotations from federal cases
discussing the federal Constitution. You are able to form no conception of the character or fundamental values of the people of the state,
and no idea how to mount an argument that certain things are more
important to the people than others. If you have found state court
decisions ·departing from the federal approach to the corresponding
federal provision, you have no idea why the courts departed from fed11. State constitutions are often less thoroughly elaborated than the federal Constitution.
See infra note 69.
12. See infra notes 141-61 and accompanying text.
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eral reasoning; at best, you are left with the vague impression that the
courts simply thought the dissents in analogous federal cases more
persuasive. But nothing in these state opinions gives you any idea of
what you, as an advocate, could say to convince the state courts once
again to reject the federal approach as a matter of state constitutional
law.
As a result of this uncertainty, you are unable to draft an argument
in which you have the slightest confidence, and you end up throwing
anything you can think of at the court and praying that something hits
the mark. If you are really dispirited, you may decide to abandon the
state constitutional claim entirely, concluding that your client's money
is better spent on trying to develop a novel federal constitutional argument; at least you will have some chance of evaluating the merits of
such an argument, whereas you have virtually no idea what will succeed or fail in state court.
This story illustrates what I call the poverty of state constitutional
discourse, by which I mean the lack of a language in which participants in the legal system can debate the meaning of the state constitution. Further, to the extent that such a state constitutional discourse
exists, its terms and conventions are often borrowed wholesale from
federal constitutional discourse, as though the language of federal constitutional law were some sort of lingua franca of constitutional argument generally. My aim in this article is to demonstrate more
formally the poverty of state constitutional discourse and to offer an
explanation for this state of affairs.
Specifically, Part I describes in more detail the concept of a state
constitutional discourse. Part II examines the New Federalism movement and its claims concerning the maturation of state constitutional
law. In Part III, I summarize the results of a survey of over 1200
cases decided by state supreme courts during 1990 to document my
claim that state constitutional discourse is impoverished and inadequate to the tasks that any constitutional discourse is designed to accomplish. Part IV discusses and rejects three common explanations
for the poverty of state constitutional discourse. In Part V, I argue
that the real reason for the failure of state constitutional discourse is
the failure of state constitutionalism itself, which is internally inconsistent and relies on inadequate and outdated assumptions concerning
the nature of state and national identity. As a result, state courts do
not talk in the way state constitutionalism predicts because to do so
would be to talk in a way that makes no sense. Part VI explores some
possible resolutions of this dilemma.

State Constitutionalism

February 1992]

I.

767

CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE

A. Definition

In the analysis that follows, I use the term constitutional discourse
in a very specific sense. By constitutional discourse, I mean a language and set of conventions that allow a participant in the legal system
to make an intelligible claim about the meaning of the constitution.
This definition is dense, so I will break it down somewhat. First, by
"participant in the legal system," I mean primarily lawyers, judges,
and litigants - the people who carry on the daily business of adjudicating actual controversies within the legal system. 13 Second, by
"claim about the meaning of the constitution," I mean simply any
statement to the effect that the relevant constitution, or any of its provisions, has a certain meaning. Examples of such claims might include
the following: "The constitution embodies our society's commitment
to the treatment of all citizens with equal dignity"; or "The Fourth
Amendment prohibits police officers from frisking an individual without some reason to suspect that the individual may be armed"; or
"Constitutional due process does not require the legislature to deal
with every aspect of an economic problem at once."
By "intelligible claim," I mean a claim about the meaning of the
constitution that is (1) acknowledged by other participants in the legal
system to be a proper way of talking about the meaning of the constitution, and (2) capable of being understood by them, and therefore
capable of being the subject of further constitutional discourse. These
are simply the conditions necessary for any sort of meaningful conversation to take place. 14 With respect to a constitution, a claim must be
intelligible if it is to be disputed by opposing counsel or adjudicated by
a judge. In our legal system, for example, a claim about the meaning
of the Constitution based on astrological portents would be considered
unintelligible under this definition because astrological arguments are
not acknowledged to be a proper way of talking about constitutions. 15
13. Much legal discourse incorporates the convenient fiction that only litigants make legal
claims and arguments, and that their lawyers never do ("plaintiff argues," "defendant contends,"
and so on). Whether the litigant or the lawyer is considered the "real" participant in the legal
system is immaterial to my analysis, although I expect that my analysis would be of interest
primarily to lawyers, since they usually craft the arguments that form the actual raw material on
which the legal system acts.
14. See, e.g., JAMES B. WHITE, HERACLES' Bow 33 (1985) [hereinafter WHITE, HERACLES];
JAMES B. WHITE, JUSTICE AS TRANSLATION 23 (1990) [hereinafter WHITE, TRANSLATION];
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100
HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1233 (1987).
15. Cf. PHILIP BOBBITI, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 6 (1982) ("[O]vert religious arguments or
appeals to let the matter be decided by chance or by reading entrails ... are not part of our legal
grammar.").
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Finally, when I refer to "federal constitutional discourse" and
"state constitutional discourse," I refer to a language and set of conventions that allow participants in the legal system to make intelligible
claims about the federal and state constitutions, respectively. 16
This definition of constitutional discourse is at the same time narrow and broad. It is narrow in that it excludes talk about a constitution that takes place outside the legal system. Those who analyze
constitutions in their sociological, ·political, or historical contexts
doubtless engage in a useful sort of constitutional discourse, but it is a
sort of discourse I shall not be concerned with here except to the extent that such analyses are or can be used within the legal system to
support legal claims about the meaning of the Constitution.17
On the other hand, the definition is broad in that it includes anything at all that the participants in the legal system consider an appropriate argument about constitutional meaning. While some have
argued that legitimate constitutional discourse should be confined to
certain types of arguments - for example, arguments about the constitutional text and intent of the Framers 18 - I include here any type
of argument widely made and accepted. Thus, if astrological or theological arguments were deemed by participants in the legal system to
be appropriate bases for adjudicating constitutional claims, they would
fall within the definition of constitutional discourse used here.
B.

The Significance of Constitutional Discourse

Before going any further, it seems appropriate to ask: Why does
constitutional discourse, thus defined, matter? Constitutional discourse matters very much, for several reasons. First, it is the means by
which authoritative interpretations of constitutions are produced. In
our system of government, not all expressions of opinion about constitutions are equal; courts have the final say, 19 and, at least with respect
to constitutional issues that come before them, the only say that is
authoritative in terms of guiding real exercises of real governmental
power. Because courts are passive in our system, responding only to
16. Because federal constitutional claims can be raised in state courts, Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), and state constitutional claims can be raised in certain
federal court cases, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), I do not distinguish here between
participants in the federal legal system and participants in state legal systems.
17. For examples of studies of the role played by the U.S. Constitution in nonlegal public life,
see MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF (1986) [hereinafter KAM·
MEN, MACHINE]; MICHAEL KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY AND LIBERTY: CONSTITUTIONAL DIS·
COURSE IN AMERICAN CuLTURE (1988).
18. See Daniel A. Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide/or the Perplexed, 49 Omo ST.
L.J. 1085 (1989).
19. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
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requests for judicial action, constitutional discourse is generally the
only means by which positive constitutional law is made, other than
by adopting or amending a constitution. In this sense, constitutional
discourse gives legal life to the constitution within the legal system of
which the constitution is a part.
But constitutional discourse is more than a mechanical procedure
for producing the authoritative interpretations of the constitution
needed to effectuate constitutional government. It is also the means by
which participants in the legal system debate among themselves the
meaning of the document. One side makes a claim about the meaning
of the constitution; the other side responds by disputing that claim and
making its own different one, which the first side disputes. The court
then jumps into the exchange, questioning, accepting, rejecting, or
modifying the claims made by the parties and reaching a conclusion.
This debate among the participants plays a significant role in shaping
the authoritative constitutional pronouncements the judicial system
ultimately yields.
That constitutional discourse comprises a debate about the meaning of the constitution has important implications for a society that
conceives of itself as living under that constitution. For what do we
debate when we debate the meaning of a constitution? It has often
been observed that any discourse is in a sense a means of self-definition, both for the individuals who engage in the discourse and the
community of individuals among whom the discourse takes place. 20
As Richard Sherwin has argued, "it is through discourse itself that
who we are and the community and culture we belong to take on an
embodied existence in the world." 21 Thus, virtually any type of discourse is a means of debating the identity - the internal roles, relations, and ethos - of the community in which it occurs. 22
But if this is true of discourse generally, it seems especially true of
constitutional discourse because a constitution is a document that selfconsciously defines a communal identity. In Part V, I discuss the nature of constitutions and American constitutionalism in some detail.
For now, it is sufficient to say that a constitution, according to our
legal and social conventions, is a document meant to identify a polit20. See, e.g., WHITE, TRANSLATION, supra note 14, at ix, 23, 217; WHITE, HERACLES, supra
note 14, at 34, 80, 169; Richard Delgado, Storytelling far Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for
Narrative, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2412 (1989); Paul W. Kahn, Community in Contemporary
Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. l, 5 (1989).
21. Richard K. Sherwin, A Matter of Voice and PloL" Belief and Suspicion in Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 543, 564 (1988).
22. WHITE, HERACLES, supra note 14, at 34, 96, 98; WHITE, TRANSLATION, supra note 14,
at 215-17.
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ical community and to set out some of the most fundamental principles according to which the members of the community wish to live
their lives. Consequently, to debate the meaning of a constitution, as
participants in the legal system do when they engage in constitutional
discourse, is to debate some aspect of the most fundamental characteristics of the constitutional community's understanding of its own identity. It is to claim that we are (or are not) a certain type of people,
who hold dear certain values and not others, and who act in certain
ways in particular situations.
Thus, constitutional discourse is an integral aspect not only of constitutional law as a body of positive legal authority, but of societal selfidentification as well. As a result, to monitor a society's constitutional
discourse is in an important sense to take the pulse of that society's
efforts to understand itself.
C. Federal Constitutional Discourse as a Model

My purpose in Part III is to describe and criticize state constitutional discourse as it is currently practiced. In particular, I shall argue
that state constitutional discourse is "impoverished." In order to get a
better sense of what this conclusion entails, we may usefully contrast
state constitutional discourse with its far more successful cousin,
American federal constitutional discourse.
Our federal constitutional discourse is extraordinarily rich. Perhaps as a result of the age or stability of the U.S. Constitution, a participant in the legal system can today make claims about the meaning
of the Constitution in a variety of ways. Among the types of arguments about the meaning of the Constitution widely acknowledged to
be appropriate are arguments from the language and structure of the
constitutional text; from history and the intent of the Framers; from
constitutional theory; from judicial precedent and legal doctrine; and
from a virtually limitless number of value systems dealing with matters such as ethics, justice, and social policy. 23 This is more than
enough raw material to allow a wide variety of disparate claims about
the meaning of the Constitution, including claims that some otherwise
active participants in the discourse may well consider outlandish. Indeed, some critics of federal constitutional jurisprudence, most
prominently originalists, have argued that federal constitutional discourse is too rich - that too many types of arguments have been incorporated into the discourse, and that some of them do not furnish a
23. See Fallon, supra note 14; BOBBITI, supra note 15.
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legitimate language in which to make claims about the meaning of the
Constitution.24
There is another reason for choosing federal constitutional discourse as a model of a successful constitutional discourse: it is the
model adopted by the New Federalism movement as the one toward
which state constitutional discourse should aspire.
II.

NEW FEDERALISM

Today's New Federalism movement has its roots in two phenomena. The first is the liberal reaction in the mid-1970s to the jurisprudence of the Burger Court. As the Burger Court slowed the expansion
of constitutionally protected individual rights begun by the Warren
Court, many liberals began to look to state courts to take up the Warren Court's legacy in the form of rights-protective state constitutional
rulings. 25 The second phenomenon is a much older and sparser tradition of criticizing state courts for ignoring state constitutions as a
source of law and for failing to develop vigorous and independent bodies of state constitutional law irrespective of the character of the constitutional jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court. 26 This strand of
thought is often marked by criticism of state constitutions as well,
often on the ground that state constitutions are poorly thought out or
insufficiently "constitutional" in outlook.27
The marriage of these two schools gave birth to a New Federalism
movement whose adherents, although occasionally impelled by different motives, 28 shared the ultimate goal of creating in every state a vigorous, independent body of state constitutional law capable of
24. For an overview of originalisrn, see Farber, supra note 18.
25. See Project Report: Toward an Activist Role for State Bills of Rights, 8 HARV. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 271 (1973) [hereinafter Project Report]; Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 1; Jerome B. Falk, Jr., The State Constitution: A More Than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CAL.
L. REV. 273 (1973); A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); see also Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions -Away From a Reactionary Approach, 9 HAsnNGS CONST. L.Q. 1 (1981); Sanford Levinson, Freedom of Speech and the Right ofAccess to Private Property Under State Constitutional
Law, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 51.
26. See Scott H. Bice, Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S. CAL. L. REv. 750
(1972); Hans A. Linde, Without "Due Process'': Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV.
125 (1970); William F. Swindler, State Constitutions for the 20th Century, 50 NEB. L. REV. 577,
583-89 (1971); Orrin K. McMurray, Note, Some Tendencies in Constitution Making, 2 CAL. L.
REV. 203, 220-24 (1914); Note, California's Constitutional Amendomania, 1 STAN. L. REV. 279,
280-81 (1949) [hereinafter Note, Amendomania]; see generally Charles R. Adrian, Trends in
State Constitutions, 5 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 311 (1968).
27. See, e.g., Swindler, supra note 26, at 590, 593; McMurray, supra note 26, at 207, 210;
Note, Amendomania, supra note 26, at 279-80.
28. Peter R. Teachout, Against the Stream: An Introduction to the Vermont Law Review
Symposium on the Revolution in State Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 13, 34-35 (1988).
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standing by itself as a basis for constitutional rulings by state courts.
Both groups also shared the belief that state constitutional law was not
living up to its potential as a source of independent law. Much of the
early literature was therefore devoted to criticizing state court decisions for what New Federalism advocates saw as sloppy or inappropriate constitutional decisionmaking practices. These practices included
avoiding reliance on state constitutions altogether; 29 analyzing state
constitutions in a perfunctory manner that provided little guidance to
litigants and lower courts;30 and inappropriately relying on federal rulings and analyses as a guide to construction of state constitutions. 31
As New Federalism matured, its adherents began increasingly to
take the view that state constitutional jurisprudence should be something more than a vehicle for relitigating civil rights battles lost in the
federal courts. Although some critics have argued that virtually all
New Federalism proponents are motivated by the bare desire to
achieve a liberal political agenda, 32 it seems clear that an ovenvhelming consensus has developed within the movement that "reactive"
state constitutional jurisprudence - state rulings that reject federal
constitutional decisions merely because the state court disagrees with
the result - is generally inappropriate. 33 Rather, state constitutional
29. E.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, Reincarnation of State Courts, 36 Sw. L.J. 951, 957-58
(1982) (observing that most state courts failed to look to state constitutions); Abrahamson, supra
note 5, at 1147 (noting that state courts fell silent in this area from the late 1950s through the
1970s); Charles G. Douglas, III, State Judicial Activism - The New Role for State Bills ofRights,
12 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1123, 1144 (1978) (state constitutions "moribund"); Stanley Mosk, State
Constitutionalism After Wa"en: Avoiding the Potomac's Ebb and Flow, in DEVELOPMENTS IN
STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 201 ("(S]tate courts were guilty of a dismal
performance in enforcing provisions of their own constitutions."); Ellen A. Peters, State Consti·
tutional Law: Federalism in the Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L. REV. 583, 587 (1986)
(State constitutional law suffered "generations of neglect - for which state courts bear a great
deal of responsibility."); Ronald K.L. Collins, Reliance on State Constitutions: Some Random
Thoughts, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 1, 4 (describing state constitutional law as "dormant").
30. Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills ofRights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REV. 379, 390 (1980).
31. Todd F. Simon, Independent But Inadequate: State Constitutions and Protection ofFreedom ofExpression, 33 KAN. L. REV. 305, 308 (1985); Developments in State Constitutional Law:
1989, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 903, 1111 (1990); see also Edmund B. Spaeth, Jr., Toward a New Partner·
ship: The Future Relationship ofFederal and State Constitutional Law, 49 U. PITT. L. REV, 729,
736-37 (1988).
32. E.g., Earl M. Maltz, The Political Dynamic of the "New Judicial Federalism," 2 EMERCJ·
ING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 233, 233 (1989).
33. E.g., Collins, supra note 25, at 2-3; Peter J. Galie, The Other Supreme Courts: Judicial
Activism Among State Supreme Courts, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 731, 779, 786 (1982); Ken
Gormley, Ten Adventures in State Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CONST. L. 29,
35 (1988); A.E. Dick Howard, The Renaissance ofState Constitutional Law, 1 EMERGING ISSUES
IN ST. CONST. L. l, 12-13 (1988); Paul S. Hudnut, State Constitutions and Individual Rights:
The Case for Judicial Restraint, 63 DENVER U. L. REV. 85, 95 (1985); Kaye, supra note 5, at
418; Robin B. Johansen, Note, The New Federalism: Toward a Principled Interpretation of the
State Constitution, 29 STAN. L. REV. 297, 300 (1977).
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law must go its own way not in order to achieve a particular result, but
because it is jurisprudentially an independent body of law.
New Federalism advocates support their arguments for state constitutional independence in several ways. Some claim a historical primacy for state constitutions. State constitutions, they argue, predated
the federal Constitution and served in many respects as models consulted by the drafters of the federal Constitution and Bill of Rights. 34
In addition, state constitutions were originally intended to be the primary vehicles for protecting the liberties of Americans, not the supplementary charters they have in many ways become. 35 Others stress the
many differences between the state and federal constitutions. They argue that a state constitution is a charter of government created by and
for a different political sovereign; that it is a distinct document with a
text that often differs significantly from its federal counterpart; and
that state courts are institutions distinct from federal courts in both
their authority and the circumstances under which that authority is
exercised. 36 These differences, it is argued, necessarily give rise to a
distinct and independent body of law.
Finally, some argue that a vigorous and independent body of state
constitutional law is not only contemplated, but virtually required, by
the American system of federalism. In a federal system, the states are
supposed to be counterweights to federal power, an arrangement
designed to protect liberty. 37 A strong, independent state constitutional jurisprudence is an important aspect of state power and independence, and thus a necessary condition of a healthy federalism. 38
34. Norman Dorsen, State Constitutional Law: An Introductory Survey, 15 CONN. L. REV.
99, 99-101 (1982); Linde, supra note 30, at 380-81; Wilkes, supra note 6, at 223-24; Ronald F.
Williams, State Constitutional Law Processes, 24 WM. & MARYL. REV. 169, 175 (1983).
35. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 247 (1833); Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate

and Independent State Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between State and
Federal Courts, 63 TExAs L. REV. 977, 979 (1985); Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Divers(ty in a
Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitutions and the Washington Declaration ofRights, in
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 239, 239.
36. See Howard, supra note 25, at 934-40; Howard, supra note 33, at 1, 8; Kaye, supra note
5, at 403; Linde, supra note 5, at 173, 181-83; Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and
the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 893-901 (1989); Lawrence Gene Sager,
Foreword: State Constitutions and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEXAS L. REV. 959, 973-76 (1985); Utter, supra note 35, at 241-43; Williams,
supra note 6, at 355, 397-404.
37. THE FEDERALIST Nos. 45, 46 (James Madison).
38. See Collins, supra note 25, at 5-6; Shirley S. Abrahamson, Homegrown Justice: The State
Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 306, 314.
For a different view, see Earl M. Maltz, Lockstep Analysis and the Concept of Federalism, 496
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 98 (1988); Maltz, supra note 3. It has also been suggested
that the U.S. Constitution pursues federalism even more directly by giving states the power to
create federal constitutional rights; this occurs because the content of the rights protected by the
Ninth Amendment is dictated by the content of the rights protected by state constitutions. See
Calvin R. Massey, The Anti-Federalist Ninth Amendment and Its Implications for State Constitu-
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As Justice Stanley Mask of the California Supreme Court has observed, New Federalism thus offers something for both liberals and
conservatives: it can offer liberals a continuation of the Warren
Court's expansion of constitutional rights, while at the same time offering conservatives "the triumph of federalism."39
Although New Federalism proponents are basically united on the
need for vigorous, independent state constitutional law, they divide
over the issue of how such a body of law should be developed. A
sizable majority seems to prefer what has come to be known as the
"primacy" approach to state constitutional interpretation,40 an approach usually identified with former Oregon Supreme Court Justice
Hans Linde, who has been called the "intellectual godfather" of New
Federalism. 41 The primacy approach holds that state courts confronted with constitutional issues should look to the state constitution
in the first instance and should interpret it in a principled way that
takes account of the text, history, structure, and underlying values of
the document. 42 In other words, state courts should approach their
state constitutions just as the U.S. Supreme Court would approach the
federal Constitution - as a unique and highly significant document
with a meaning that can and must be derived through independent
analysis of the document itself.
In contrast, a minority of New Federalism proponents prefer the
"interstitial" approach to state constitutional adjudication. 43 This approach holds that state courts should look in the first instance to the
federal Constitution where that document. can provide a basis for decision. Only if federal constitutional law approves the challenged state
action, or is ambiguous, should the state court then tum to the state
tional Law, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1229; Eric B. Schnurer, It Is a Constitution We Are Expanding:
An Essay on Constitutional Past, Present, and Future, 1 EMERGING lssUES IN ST. CONST. L. 135
(1988).
39. Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism: Both Liberal and Conservative, 63 TEXAS L.
REV. 1081, 1081 (1985).
40. Among the many who have endorsed the primacy approach are Abrahamson, supra note
29, at 962-63; Douglas, supra note 29, at 1145-46; Falk, supra note 25, at 285-86; Project Report,
supra note 25, at 289; Frank G. Mahady, Toward a Theory ofState Constitutional Jurisprudence:
A Judge's Thoughts, 13 VT. L. REv. 145, 146 (1988); Simon, supra note 31, at 316; Utter, supra
note 35, at 247; Collins, supra note 29, at 7-9.
41. Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once ''New Judicial Federalism" & Its Critics, 64
wASH. L. REV. 5, 5 (1989) (quoting Jeffrey Toobin, Better Than Burger, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar.
4, 1985, at 10, 11).
42. Linde, supra note 5, at 178-81; Linde, supra note 30, at 380, 392.
43. Developments in the Law: The Interpretation ofState Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L.
REv. 1324, 1330-31 (1982) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; Hudnut, supra note 33, at 99100; see also Peters, supra note 29, at 589-92 (advocating flexible approach to state constitutional
interpretation).
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constitution.44 According to Justice Stewart Pollock of the New
Jersey Supreme Court, the most articulate defender of the interstitial
approach, this method is preferable to the primacy approach because
it acknowledges the U.S. Constitution as the basic protector of individual rights in our society.45 State constitutional law thus plays a more
modest role than it would under the primacy approach. 46 However,
Justice Pollock has cautioned that in order to avoid a state constitutional jurisprudence that merely reacts to federal rulings, state courts
must diverge from federal holdings and results only in accordance
with appropriate objective criteria.47
In 1983, New Federalism received an unlikely boost from the U.S.
Supreme Court. In Michigan v. Long, 48 the Court reconsidered its
prior rulings concerning the doctrine of adequate and independent
state grounds. Under this doctrine, the Supreme Court will not review
a state court decision that rests on state law grounds even if the state
decision also rests on federal law grounds for which a federal appeal
normally would be available. 49 The Court had reasoned that because
state law is unreviewable by federal courts, a Supreme Court decision
on the federal issue could not affect the outcome of the case and would
therefore be an advisory opinion beyond the Court's Article III jurisdiction. 50 In Long, the Court held that it would henceforth consider a
state court decision to rest on adequate and independent state grounds
only if it "indicates clearly and expressly that it is alternatively based
on bona fide, separate, adequate, and independent grounds." 51 Thus,
the Court now requires state courts to say explicitly when their deci44. Pollock, supra note 2, at 718; see also Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 13S6-66
(discussing application of the interstitial model).
4S. Pollock, supra note 2, at 718.
46. See Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 13S8 ("The state court's role is not to
construct a complete system of fundamental rights from the ground up.").
47. Pollock, supra note 2, at 718; see also State v. Hunt, 4SO A.2d 9S2, 96S-67 (N.J. 1982)
(Handler, J., concurring) (suggesting seven criteria for determining when the court should diverge from federal constitutional law).
A third approach has been identified in which state courts resolve all parallel state and federal
constitutional claims regardless of the outcome of either analysis; that is, the court will not stop
its analysis after turning to one constitution or the other, even if that analysis provides a definitive resolution to the case. This approach has been accurately criticized for creating an unreviewable state body of federal constitutional dicta. Bice, supra note 26; Pollock, supra note 3S, at
983. But see Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEXAS
L. REV. 102S, 1029-41 (198S) (arguing that this approach allows state courts to contribute to the
development of federal constitutional law).
48. 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
49. 463 U.S. at 1038-42.
SO. 463 U.S. at 1040; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 12S-26 (194S), overruled on other
grounds by Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
SI. 463 U.S. at 1041.
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sions rest on state grounds if state courts want to insulate their decisions from Supreme Court review.
Some New Federalism proponents have condemned Long because
they view it as resting on a presumption that state courts will decide
cases on federal grounds, a presumption that they consider disrespectful to state sovereignty and contrary to established principles of federalism. 52 This criticism is greatly overblown. Not only can the Long
requirement of clarity be satisfied simply by adding a caption or explanatory sentence to a court's opinion, 53 but it requires state courts to
do exactly what New Federalism proponents have been urging them to
do: think explicitly about the grounds of their decisions, and make
those grounds clear in their opinions. S4
All in all, New Federalism advocates seem unremittingly optimistic about the prospects for achieving the movement's goals. They
point with pride to the fact that state courts have decided over four
hundred cases construing state constitutions to provide greater protections for individual rights than the federal Constitution.ss They write
articles about state constitutional law with titles that include words
such as "revival," "reincarnation," "renaissance," "revolution," and
"reemergence."56 They devote close scholarly attention to independent state constitutional decisions, s7 and they have held numerous sym52. See, e.g., William W. Greenhalgh, Independent and Adequate State Grounds: The Long
and the Short ofIt, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 211,
214-21.
53. The New Hampshire Supreme Court routinely does this. See infra notes 172-74 and
accompanying text.
54. Joseph R. Grodin, Some Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
391, 399 (1988). See also PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). There the
Supreme Court refused to disturb on federal constitutional grounds a California ruling that the
state constitution provided greater protections to freedom of speech than did the federal Constitution. 447 U.S. at 88. In reaching this decision the Court relied on the California Supreme
Court's clearly stated reasons for concluding that broader state-protected rights of expression did
not impermissibly infringe on appellants' federal property or First Amendment rights. 447 U.S.
at 78, 83-84.
55. David Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privileges and Immunities": A State's Version of
"Equal Protection," 13 VT. L. REv. 221, 221 (1988); see also Sol Wachtler, Our Constitutions Alive and Well. 61 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 381, 397 (1987) (stating that state courts issued 350 such
opinions between 1970 and 1984).
56. Abrahamson, supra note 29, at 951; Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 535; James
C. Harrington, Reemergence of Texas Constitutional Protection, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST.
CONST. L. 101, 101 (1989); Howard, supra note 33, at 1; Symposium on the Revolution in State
Constitutional Law, 13 VT. L. REv. 11, 11 (1988).
57. See, e.g., John H. Buttler, Oregon's Constitutional Renaissance: Federalism Revisited, 13
VT. L. REV. 107 (1988); Galie, supra note 33; Howard, supra note 33; Howard, supra note 25;
Levinson, supra note 25, at 51; Simon, supra note 31; Wilkes, supra note 6; Donald E. Wilkes, Jr.,
The New Federalism in Criminal Procedure in 1984: Death of the Phoenix?, in DEVELOPMENTS
JN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 166; Williams, supra note 6.
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posia on state constitutional law. 58 A new journal called Emerging
Issues in State Constitutional Law has even been established to provide
a forum for such commentary. 5 9
Is this optimism well founded? Have state courts responded to
Justice Brennan's call and begun to develop, in the past fifteen years,
an independent jurisprudence of state constitutional law? The answer
will be found by examining current state constitutional discourse. If a
robust, independent state constitutional law exists, it must be manifested by an equally robust and independent state constitutional discourse that allows participants in state legal systems to raise, debate,
and adjudicate claims about the meaning of state constitutions. 60
New Federalism predicts that such a discourse could take two possible forms. If a state adopted the primacy approach to constitutional
adjudication, it would develop a state constitutional discourse in
which intelligible claims about the meaning of the state constitution
could be based on the text, history, structure, and underlying values of
the state constitution. Such a discourse would in all likelihood closely
resemble federal constitutional discourse in tone and style, although
its participants would be free to accept or reject the legitimacy of any
or all of the language or conventions of the cognate federal discourse.
Moreover, any similarities in case outcomes or doctrine would be
purely fortuitous, since the state discourse would stand on its own.
Thus, if a state court happened to reach the same result under the state
constitution as the federal courts have reached under the U.S. Constitution, that congruity might only reflect the fact that both constitutions are rooted in similar historical or political circumstances.
If a state adopted an interstitial approach to constitutional adjudication, its state constitutional discourse would take a slightly different
form. Instead of being independent and internally complete, such a
discourse would focus on the ways in which the state and federal con58. E.g., DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7 (Williamsburg
Conference); State Constitutions in a Federal System, 496 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. Sci.
1 (1988); Symposium on State Constitutional Jurisprudence, 15 liAsTINGS CoNsr. L.Q. 391
(1988); Symposium on State Constitutional Law, 64 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989); Symposium on the
Revolution in State Constitutional Law, supra note 56; Symposium, The Emergence ofState Constitutional Law, 63 TExAs L. REv. 959 (1985); Symposium, Special Section: The Connecticut
Constitution, 15 CoNN. L. REV. 7 (1982).
59. The journal is published by the National Association of Attorneys General. The inaugural issue appeared in 1988.
60. See supra section I.B. This is a very different method of evaluating the condition of state
constitutional law than that employed by many New Federalists, who seem to view the number
of state decisions deviating from federal law as an important indicator of the health of state
constitutional law. However, deviations from federal law alone do not necessarily indicate the
presence of a robust and independent state constitutional discourse. See infra notes 143-50 and
accompanying text.
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stitutions differ from each other. Thus, state constitutional discourse
would be a "discourse of distinctness" - it would comprise a language and set of conventions enabling participants in the legal system
to argue that provisions of the state constitution mean something different from their federal counterparts. Because this discourse would
use federal constitutional discourse as a starting point, it would probably have to incorporate the various elements of federal constitutional
discourse such as text, framers' intent, constitutional theory, judicial
precedent, and societal values. However, state constitutional discourse would contain additional features that would allow participants
to apply these elements of federal constitutional discourse to the state
constitution and to construct intelligible arguments that the state and
federal constitutions differ in dispositive ways. 6 1
It is possible, and perhaps likely, that these two different types of
state constitutional discourse would end up looking very much the
same. If there were an irreducible difference between them, it would
be this: while both types of discourse would yield meanings for the
state constitution, participants in a discourse accompanying the interstitial approach would care fundamentally about the meaning of the
federal Constitution, whereas participants in a discourse accompanying the primacy approach would not.
With this discussion in mind, we now have the tools to assess the
optimistic claims of New Federalism. In the next Part, I review state
constitutional discourse as it was practiced in 1990, and conclude that
it not only falls immensely short of New Federalism ideals, but often
seems barely to exist at all. 6 2

III.

THE POVERTY OF STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DISCOURSE

The editors of the Draft Model State Constitution have accurately
observed that there can really be no such thing as a model state constitution because there is no such thing as a model state. 63 It unfortunately follows that the only completely accurate way to examine the
status of state constitutional law would be to look at every relevant
61. The interstitial approach is generally less applicable to state constitutional provisions
without federal analogue, of which there are many. See infra notes 243-55 and accompanying
text. Proponents of the interstitial approach have not outlined how they would interpret such
provisions, but it seems that they would be driven by necessity to use something like the primacy
approach.
62. I should note here that the reader who is willing to accept my conclusions about the
poverty of state constitutional discourse, whether from personal experience or on faith, can skip
·the following Part and turn directly to my analysis of the problem in Parts IV and V without loss
of continuity.
63. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, MODEL STATE CONSTITUTION vii (rev. 6th ed. 1968).
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decision of every state court. That would have' made my project unmanageable, so I have narrowed the field of inquiry in four ways.
First, I have confined myself to a sampling of seven states: New York,
Massachusetts, Virginia, Louisiana, California, Kansas, and New
Hampshire. 64 Second, I have examined only decisions of the highest
court of each state. 65 Third, I have excluded decisions in which the
state high court did not write a full opinion, or at least perform some
kind of legal analysis. Thus, I have not considered summary or memorandum decisions, or any other type of decision that does not reveal
in the decision itself the nature of the case and the court's reasoning.
Finally, I have confined my analysis to cases decided during a single
year, 1990, the most recent for which published state high court deci64. I selected this sample in the following way. Going into the research, I hypothesized that
five factors might be relevant to the condition of constitutional law and discourse in any given
state: (1) the size of the state; (2) its age; (3) the presence of an unusual founding history;
(4) the continuity of its constitutional traditions; and (5) the nature of the constitutional text.
The size of the state would be relevant because of the sheer number of cases litigated: the more
constitutional cases litigated, the more constitutional rulings made, and the more developed the
state's body of constitutional law. The age of the state would be relevant for the same reason;
older states would have had a longer period in which to develop a substantial body of constitutional rulings. An unusual founding history would be relevant in that it might be reflected in the
state constitution, thereby providing an occasion for developing constjtutional doctrines different
from federal constitutional law. The presence of such differences might then serve as a focal
point for the development of a strong, independent body of state constitutional law. The continuity of a state's constitutional traditions would be relevant in two ways. First, a constitution
in long continuous use is more likely to be extensively construed than a relatively new document.
Second, a history of frequent constitutional revisions might be indicative of an approach by the
people of the state toward constitutional law that differs from the approach taken by the nation
toward the national Constitution. Finally, peculiarities of the constitutional text might be the
occasion for developing independent bodies of state constitutional law; they might also indicate
underlying state attitudes concerning the functions that constitutions ought to serve. In looking
at state constitutions in this last category, however, it became clear that the search for "peculiarities" would be too subjective, so I decided eventually to look only at the length of the constitutional text.
According to these criteria, a representative sample of states would include states of varying
sizes, ages, and histories, with constitutional traditions of varying continuity and constitutions of
varying lengths. To keep the sample size manageable, I tried to choose states that were interesting for more than one quality. The states selected fit the criteria as follows. New York and
California are very large, and New Hampshire is very small. New York, Massachusetts, Virginia, and New Hampshire are very old states; Louisiana, Kansas, and California are intermediate to young. I avoided extremely young states such as Alaska and Hawaii because it seemed
unlikely that they have had the time necessary to develop a substantial body of constitutional
law. Louisiana has an unusual history of French and Spanish influence, and is the only state in
the union to retain a civil law system. New York, with its background of early Dutch settlement,
also has a somewhat atypical history. With respect to continuity, Massachusetts and New
Hampshire have had only one constitution each since they became states; Louisiana has had
eleven constitutions, the most of any state. Finally, the New Hampshire and Massachusetts
constitutions are among the shortest of state constitutions, the New York constitution among the
longest. Kansas fell into the middle of the pack in virtually every category, and was selected for
that reason.
65. This is probably just as well, since it seems that state supreme courts are far more likely
to devote sustained attention to state constitutional issues than are lower state courts. Also, it is
often difficult to obtain good data on state trial court decisions. In contrast, state supreme court
opinions are all published and readily available.

Michigan Law Review

780

[Vol. 90:761

sions were available. 66 These reductions yielded an overall sample size
of 1208 cases.
In addition to systematically examining the cases included in the
sample, I have also delved more anecdotally into decisions rendered in
other states and in different years. This spot-checking supports the
conclusions derived from studying the primary sample.
A.
1.

General Trends

The Infrequency of State Constitutional Decisions

One of the most striking aspects of state constitutional decisions is
their relative infrequency. In calendar year 1990, the U.S. Supreme
Court issued 137 full opinions, of which 73, or 53%, involved resolution of at least one federal constitutional issue. None of the state
courts surveyed here construed its own state constitution with anything remotely approaching that frequency. Even using the most generous method of counting state constitutional decisions, 67 the courts of
the sample states decided state constitutional issues in only about 21 %
of their cases, or about 40% as often as the U.S. Supreme Court construed the federal Constitution. Broken down by state, the rates were
California, 31 %; Massachusetts, 24%; New Hampshire, 26%; New
York, 20%; Kansas, 18%; Louisiana, 15%; and Virginia, 7%. 68
66. While focusing on a single year may result in some distortion due to annual variations in
caseload and the like, I suspect that the more recent the focus, the more any distortion would
tend to favor the predictions of New Federalism. This is because independent state constitutional decisions are more likely with the passage of time, for two reasons. First, the more recent
the year, the more time the message of the New Federalism has had to penetrate the state judiciaries. Second, the U.S. Supreme Court continues each year to slow or reverse the expansion of
federally protected rights, thus providing state courts with more to react against, to the extent
that their constitutional jurisprudence is at heart a reactive one.
67. A small percentage of the opinions surveyed were unclear as to whether the courts' holdings rose to constitutional dimensions; a much larger percentage were unclear as to whether the
courts' rulings were based on the state or federal constitution. For the purpose of comparing
constitutional decision rates, I have counted all these ambiguous decisions among the state constitutional rulings. However, I have excluded rulings that unambiguously relied only on the U.S.
Constitution. For a more complete breakdown of state decisions, see infra note 68. For a discussion of cases that do not clearly identify the constitution upon which the court relies, see infra
notes 85-98 and accompanying text.
68. The actual numbers are as follows (all figures refer to cases decided in 1990). In 1990,
the New York Court of Appeals issued 240 opinions containing some kind of legal analysis. Of
these, 184 involved no constitutional issue of any kind, 7 involved only a federal constitutional
claim, and 37 dealt with state constitutional claims. An additional 12 opinions left unclear
whether the holding of the case rose to constitutional dimensions. During the same period, the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court issued 273 full opinions. Of these, 186 involved no con·
stitutional issues, 12 raised only a federal constitutional issue, 62 arguably dealt with at least one
state constitutional question, and in 13 cases it was unclear whether the ruling had constitutional
dimensions.
The Virginia Supreme Court over the same period issued 147 full opinions. Of these, 130
involved no constitutional issue, 7 raised only a federal constitutional claim, and 8 arguably
involved state constitutional claims. In another 2 cases, it was unclear whether the ruling bad
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State constitutional law thus comprises a significantly smaller proportion of the state high court docket than federal constitutional law
does for the Supreme Court. Although it is not clear from this data
alone whether the dearth of state constitutional cases is due to the
failure of litigants to raise such claims or to a weeding out of constitutional cases due to jurisdictional or procedural considerations, I suggest reasons below to suspect the former. Either way, the lack of
decisions alone retards the development of state constitutional law and
discourse - the development of a language, after all, requires the opportunity to speak. 69
2.

Grudging Resort to the State Constitution

Just as striking as the infrequency of state constitutional decisions,
and undoubtedly one of its causes, is what can only be characterized as
a general unwillingness among state supreme courts to engage in any
kind of analysis of the state constitution at all. I will use New York as
an example, although this unwillingness exists to an equal or greater
extent in Massachusetts, Virginia, and Kansas, and to a somewhat
lesser extent in California and Louisiana.
The grudging character of the New York Court of Appeals' state
constitutional analyses permeates the great majority of its decisions in
the sample. In 1990, the court decided 37 cases that can arguably be
viewed as resting in whole or in part on the state constitution. In 12 of
them, the only mention of the state constitution consists of either a
passing acknowledgement that a party is raising a state constitutional
claim; a citation, without further comment, to the state constitution;
or the bare assertion that the case comes out the same way under both
the state and federal constitutions. 70 In other words, the opinions conconstitutional dimensions. The Louisiana Supreme Court issued 149 full opinions, of which 119
involved no constitutional issue, 8 raised only federal constitutional issues, 21 dealt with at least
one state constitutional issue, and one was unclear as to its constitutional roots.
The California Supreme Court issued 118 full opinions in 1990, of which 36 contained at least
one issue of state constitutional law. An additional 76 involved no constitutional issue, and 6
cases dealt only with federal constitutional issues. The Kansas Supreme Court issued 142 opinions; 100 of these raised no constitutional issue, 16 dealt only with federal constitutional issues,
21 involved or arguably involved state constitutional issues, and in 5 cases it was unclear whether
the case had constitutional dimensions.
In 1990, the New Hampshire Supreme Court issued 139 full opinions. Of these, 98 did not
address any constitutional question, 34 dealt with state constitutional claims, 5 involved only
federal claims, and in 2 cases it was unclear whether the case had constitutional dimensions.
69. This may be especially true given that state constitutions are on average almost four
times as long as the U.S Constitution. Albert L. Sturm, The Development of American State
Constitutions, 12 PUBLIUS 57, 74-76 (1982). It seems logical that state constitutions would thus
require considerably more exegesis than the federal Constitution in order to play a comparable
role in state Jaw.
70. People v. Carter, 566 N.E.2d 119, 120, 123 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1599
(1991); Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 564 N.E.2d 1046, 1047, 1049 (N.Y. 1990); People
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tain nothing that could be regarded as analysis of the state constitution. In 12 more opinions, there is no mention of or citation to any
constitution; the court merely holds that some "right" or "constitutional right" is at issue. 71
Consider some examples. In People v. Sides, 72 a criminal defendant claimed inadequate assistance of counsel under both the state and
federal constitutions. The court held that the defendant's "right to
counsel" had been violated, but gave no indication of whether the relevant right was a state or federal one. 73 In People v. Cain, 74 the court
reversed a conviction on the ground that the defendant had been denied his "right to be present, with counsel, at all material stages of a
trial." 75 The court then cited both the U.S. and New York constitutions, but did not say whether its ruling rested on one or both. 76 In In
re Jamal C., 77 the court ruled that the respondent had "no constitutional right to the presence of counsel. " 78 The court did not cite any
constitution at all. In none of these cases did the court make any
statement of the kind required by Michigan v. Long to the effect that
its decision rested on adequate and independent state grounds.
In each of these cases it is essentially impossible to determine by
reading the case whether it is a state constitutional ruling at all. Such
cases squelch the development of state constitutional discourse in at
least two ways. First, ambiguity about the basis of the court's ruling
v. Ortiz, 564 N.E.2d 630, 632 (N.Y. 1990); Schneider v. Sobol, 558 N.E.2d 23, 24 (N.Y. 1990);
McKenzie v. Jackson, 556 N.E.2d 1072 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Basora, 556 N.E.2d 1070, 1071
(N.Y. 1990); People v. Cain, 556 N.E.2d 141, 143 (N.Y. 1990); Seelig v. Koehler, 556 N.E.2d
125, 126 (N.Y. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 134 (1990); Forti v. New York State Ethics
Commn., 554 N.E.2d 876, 882-86 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Hernandez, 552 N.E.2d 621, 624 (N.Y.
1990), ajfd. sub nom. Hernandez v. New York, 111 S. Ct. 1859 (1991); People v. Sides, 551
N.E.2d 1233, 1234 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Cintron, 551 N.E.2d 561, 566, 567 (N.Y. 1990).
71. People v. Rodriguez, 564 N.E.2d 658, 659 (N.Y. 1990) ("due process right to be present
at trial"); People v. LaClere, 564 N.E.2d 640, 641 (N.Y. 1990) ("right to counsel"); People v.
Thomas, 563 N.E.2d 280, 281 (N.Y. 1990) ("right to have counsel at the lineup"); People v.
Gordon, 563 N.E.2d 274, 275 (N.Y. 1990) ("showup identification"); City of New York v. State,
562 N.E.2d 118, 121 (N.Y. 1990) ("equal protection argument"); People v. Harris, 559 N.E.2d
660, 661 (N.Y. 1990) ("due process" right); In re Lionel F., 558 N.E.2d 30, 31 (N.Y. 1990)
("double jeopardy"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 304 (1990); People v. Garcia, 555 N.E.2d 902, 902
(N.Y. 1990) ("ineffective assistance of counsel"); People v. Wandell, 554 N.E.2d 1274, 1274
(N.Y. 1990) ("effective assistance of counsel"); People v. Gonzales, 554 N.E.2d 1269, 1270 (N.Y.
1990) ("right to counsel"), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 99 (1990); In re Jamal C., 553 N.E.2d 1018,
1019 (N.Y. 1990) ("constitutional right to the presence of counsel"); People v. Tuck, 551 N.E.2d
578, 578 (N.Y. 1990) ("right to confrontation").
72. 551 N.E.2d 1233, 1234 (N.Y. 1990).
73. 551 N.E.2d at 1235.
74. 556 N.E.2d 141 (N.Y. 1990).
75. 556 N.E.2d at 143.
76. 556 N.E.2d at 143.
77. 553 N.E.2d 1018 (N.Y. 1990).
78. 553 N.E.2d at 1019.
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impairs the usefulness of a case for the purpose of debating the meaning of the state constitution. This is because it is highly awkward, if
not impossible, to use a case as the basis for an argument about the
meaning of the state constitution if it is unclear from the case itself
whether the case is even about the state constitution.
Second, such ambiguity is self-perpetuating. Suppose one party
claims that a case construes the state constitution and the other party
contends that it deals with the federal Constitution. It is very unlikely
that a state court, particularly a lower court, will attempt to resolve
such a dispute. In all likelihood, the court will hold that it need not
resolve the ambiguity; all we need to know, the court will say, is that
controlling state precedent recognizes the existence of a constitutional
right in the circumstances at hand. Consequently, the court need only
apply the ambiguous case, resulting in a ruling of equal ambiguity.
Eventually, a small body oflaw may evolve that cannot be traced with
any confidence to either the state or federal constitutions. 79 Such a
development can only inhibit the creation of a robust state constitutional discourse. The most fundamental requirement for the creation
of a discourse is agreement concerning when participants should be
understood to be engaging in the discourse. Decisions such as these
virtually preclude any such understanding.
Just as important, however, is the message that the court sends
when, like the New York Court of Appeals, 65% of its decisions explicitly or arguably involving the state constitution share these flaws.
The message is: "This activity is not important to us. We will not
treat such claims with much attention or care, so you are probably
wasting your time raising them." It is hard to conceive of a lawyer
who would spend much time developing a thorough or novel state
constitutional claim after receiving such a message from the state's
highest court.
The result of the Court of Appeals' approach to state constitutional claims has been to discourage litigants from making such claims
at all. This discouragement appears between the lines of New York
decisions, which show their disdain for the state constitution by giving
short shrift to the great majority of state constitutional claims. But
another important sign of this discouragement is the comparatively
low proportion of cases - probably no more than 15% 80 - on the
79. For an example of this, see the discussion of State v. Prewett, infra notes 96-98 and
accompanying text.
80. See supra note 68 for a numerical breakdown of decisions. The 15% figure is derived by
counting state constitutional decisions in a more realistic way than they were counted in note 67,
supra, that is, by excluding from the total those decisions that were unclear as to whether they
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Court of Appeals docket that even request a state constitutional ruling
of any kind.
This last conclusion is borne out by other data. For example, both
the New York and U.S. constitutions protect the freedom of speech. 81
In 1990, New York trial courts issued a total of 3 published opinions
dealing with free speech claims under the state constitution. 82 During
the same period, U.S. district courts sitting in New York issued 15
published opinions adjudicating free speech claims under the First
Amendment. 83 This suggests that when litigants in New York had a
choice of going to federal or state court on constitutional issues dealing with free speech, they overwhelmingly chose to go to federal court,
even though they may thereby have lost the chance to raise a claim
under the state constitution. Obviously, these litigants placed a very
low value on the opportunity to raise a state constitutional claim. 84
had any sort of constitutional dimension. That leaves 37 out of 240 cases, or approximately
15%.
81. U.S. CoNsr. amend. I; N.Y. CoNsr. art. I,§ 8.
82. People v. Perkins, 558 N.Y.S.2d 459 (Dist. Ct. 1990); People v. Reynolds, 554 N.Y.S.2d
391 (City Ct. 1990); People v. Blanchette, 554 N.Y.S.2d 388 (City Ct. 1990). A fourth case,
People v. Pennisi, 563 N.Y.S.2d 612 (Sup. Ct. 1990), is unclear as to whether the constitutional
claim adjudicated is a federal or state claim. A fifth case, Delano Village Cos. v. Orridge, 553
N.Y.S.2d 938 (Sup. Ct. 1990), seems clearly to decide a free speech claim under the federal
Constitution but is unclear about whether the ruling should also be understood as one under the
state constitution. Also during 1990, the Court of Appeals decided 2 free speech claims under
the state constitution. Johnson Newspaper Corp. v. Melino, 564 N.E.2d 1046 (N.Y. 1990);
Golden v. Clark, 564 N.E.2d 611 (N.Y. 1990). Research for this footnote was confined to published decisions.
83. Piesco v. City of New York, 753 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (retaliatory discharge);
New York News, Inc. v. Metropolitan Transp. Auth., 753 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (restricting sale of newspapers); Levin v. Harleston, 752 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (academic
freedom); Central Am. Refugee Ctr. v. City of Glen Cove, 753 F. Supp. 437 (E.D.N.Y. 1990)
(seeking employment); New York State Assn. of Career Schools v. State Educ. Dept., 749 F.
Supp. 1264 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (regulation of schools); Uryevick v. Rozzi, 751 F. Supp. 1064
(E.D.N.Y. 1990) (employment rules); New Alliance Party v. Dinkins, 743 F. Supp. 1055
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (regulation of political party rally); Wojnarowicz v. American Family Assn.,
745 F. Supp. 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (state copyright law); Don King Prods., Inc. v. Douglas, 742
F. Supp. 778 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (libel); New York State Natl. Org. for Women v. Terry, 737 F.
Supp. 1350 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (civil rights); Starace v. Chicago Tribune Co., 17 Media L. Rep.
(BNA) 2330 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (libel); Selkirk v. Boyle, 738 F. Supp. 70 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (public
employment); Bardell v. General Elec. Co., 732 F. Supp. 327 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (workplace confl·
dentiality); Saraceno v. City of Utica, 733 F. Supp. 538 (N.D.N.Y. 1990) (retaliatory discharge);
Young v. New York City Transit Auth., 729 F. Supp. 341(S.D.N.Y.1990) (regulation of begging).
Again, research did not extend to unpublished district court opinions. Also excluded from
this group are any cases that could not reasonably have been adjudicated in state court. For
example, 14 cases in which the United States was a plaintiff or defendant have been excluded.
84. This result is even more surprising given the New York Court of Appeals' explicit assertion that the state constitution provides greater protection for free speech than the federal Constitution. Immuno AG. v. Moor-Jankowski, 567 N.E.2d 1270, 1277-78 (N.Y. 1991); O'Neitt v.
Oakgrove Constr., 523 N.E.2d 277, 280 n.3 (N.Y. 1988). On the other hand, even when the
court claims to expand constitutional protection, it seems to do so in a way that does not greatly
assist the development of a state constitutional discourse. For example, the court has said that
New York "has its own exceptional history and rich tradition" of freedom of the press, Immuno
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Obscurity Concerning the Basis of Rulings

One aspect of the grudging character of state constitutional decisions discussed above is the failure of the court to specify whether its
analyses and rulings relied on the state or federal constitutions. This
obscurity is so prevalent, however, that it requires separate discussion.
It has already been_ noted that a substantial proportion of the New
York decisions share this flaw. The situation in other states is similar.
In 29 cases decided by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
the court failed entirely to specify whether certain of the parties'
claims, much less its own analysis and ruling, rested on state or federal
constitutional grounds, or both. 85 For example, in Commonwealth v.
Matthews, 86 the defendant claimed, according to the court, that the
exclusion of certain jurors violated his "constitutional right to a random selection of jurors from a fair cross-section of the community." 87
The court did not say whether the defendant's "constitutional right"
was a state or federal one and, although it cited only Massachusetts
AG., 561 N.E.2d at 1278, but it fails to define that history and tradition and to explain why they
require results that differ from federal law. For a discussion of this assertion/counterassertion
problem, see infra notes 141-50 and accompanying text.
85. Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 563 N.E.2d 1367, 1369 (Mass. 1990) (inadequate assistance
of counsel); Commonwealth v. Todd, 563 N.E.2d 211, 213 (Mass. 1990) (suppression of statement); Strasnick v. Board of Registration in Pharmacy, 562 N.E.2d 1333, 1337-38 (Mass. 1990)
(due process); Commonwealth v. Colon-Cruz, 562 N.E.2d 797, 802-05 (Mass. 1990) (suppression
of confession, suggestive identification); Commonwealth v. Rosado, 562 N.E.2d 790, 795-96
(Mass. 1990) (inadequate assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Colon, 558 N.E.2d 974, 97982 (Mass. 1990) (suppression of confession); Commonwealth v. Zagranski, 558 N.E.2d 933, 935
(Mass. 1990) (probable cause); Commonwealth v. Tart, 557 N.E.2d 1123, 1130-31 (Mass. 1990)
(self-incrimination); Commonwealth v. Moses, 557 N.E.2d 14, 16-18 (Mass. 1990) (stop and
frisk); Commonwealth v. Bousquet, 556 N.E.2d 37, 41-43 (Mass. 1990) (suppression, inadequate
assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v. Dunn, 556 N.E.2d 30, 32-35 (Mass. 1990) (suppression
issues); Luna v. Superior Court, 555 N.E.2d 881, 883 (Mass. 1990) (waiver of privilege against
self-incrimination); Commonwealth v. Roberts, 555 N.E.2d 588, 589-90 (Mass. 1990) (suppression of defendant's statement); Commonwealth v. Pratt, 555 N.E.2d 559, 566-67 (Mass. 1990)
(search warrant sufficiency); Commonwealth v. Perrot, 554 N.E.2d 1205 (Mass. 1990) (suppression issue); Commonwealth v. Downey, 553 N.E.2d 1303, 1307 (Mass. 1990) (suppression of
pretrial identification); Richardson v. Sheriff of Middlesex County, 553 N.E.2d 1286, 1290-93
(Mass. 1990) (prison conditions); Commonwealth v. Mamay, 553 N.E.2d 945, 952-53 (Mass.
1990) (inadequate assistance of counsel); Care & Protection of Martha, 553 N.E.2d 902, 908
(Mass. 1990) (due process); Commonwealth v. Couture, 552 N.E.2d 538, 539-40 (Mass. 1990)
(probable cause); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 552 N.E.2d 101, 104-05 (Mass. 1990) (right to
counsel); Commonwealth v. Robbins, 552 N.E.2d 77, 79-80 (Mass. 1990) (suppression in connection with search of auto; requires application of "constitutional principles"); Commonwealth v.
Berrio, 551 N.E.2d 496, 499 (Mass. 1990) (due process); Commonwealth v. Davis, 551 N.E.2d
39, 41-42 (Mass. 1990) (due process, equal protection); Commonwealth v. Yesilciman, 550
N.E.2d 378, 382-83 (Mass. 1990) (adequacy of search warrant); Commonwealth v. Pope, 549
N.E.2d 1120, 1126 n.8 (Mass. 1990) (ineffective assistance of counsel); Commonwealth v.
Bembury, 548 N.E.2d 1255, 1261-62 (Mass. 1990) (due process); Commonwealth v. Durning,
548 N.E.2d 1242, 1247-48 (Mass. 1990) (due process); Commonwealth v. Matthews, 548 N.E.2d
843, 848 (Mass. 1990) (right to jury representing fair cross-section of community).
86. 548 N.E.2d 843 (Mass. 1990).
87. 548 N.E.2d at 848.
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cases in its analysis, gave no indication, such as a Long statement, that
its analysis rested on state constitutional grounds.
In 9 cases, the court went so far as to state explicitly that the litigants were raising a claim under both the state and federal constitutions, but then failed to specify the basis of its own analysis. 88 For
example, Commonwealth v. Purdy 89 involved a cruel and unusual punishment claim under both the federal and state constitutions. In ruling
on the claim, the court relied on one Massachusetts and one federal
case, cited to neither the state nor federal constitution, and made no
Long statement. It is thus impossible to tell whether this case should
be considered part of state or federal constitutional discourse.
The Virginia Supreme Court decided only 8 cases that can plausibly be viewed as involving state constitutional issues. 90 In 6 of these
cases the court failed to specify whether its analysis dealt with the
federal or state constitution. Typical is Brown v. Brown, 91 which dealt
with an unidentified procedural due process issue. The courts of Louisiana92 and California93 also regularly failed to specify the basis of
88. Commonwealth v. Scott, 564 N.E.2d 370, 374-75 (Mass. 1990) (right to exculpatory evi·
dence); Commonwealth v. Purdy, 562 N.E.2d 1347, 1351-52 (Mass. 1990) (cruel and unusual
punishment); Commonwealth v. Rosado, 562 N.E.2d 790, 794 (Mass. 1990) (right to speedy
trial); Commonwealth v. Cameron, 553 N.E.2d 898 (Mass. 1990) (roadblock); Commonwealth v.
Freeman, 552 N.E.2d 553, 555-57 (Mass. 1990) (due process/tainted grand jury); Common·
wealth v. Rutkowski, 550 N.E.2d 362, 363-64 (Mass. 1990) (warrant description); Common·
wealth v. Pope, 549 N.E.2d 1120, 1125-26 (Mass. 1990) (right to remain silent); Commonwealth
v. Durning, 548 N.E.2d 1242, 1248-50 (Mass. 1990) (due process right to present a defense);
Commonwealth v. Santoro, 548 N.E.2d 862, 863-64 (Mass. 1990) (standing to challenge search).
89. 562 N.E.2d 1347 (Mass. 1990).
90. Brown v. Brown, 397 S.E.2d 837, 839 (Va. 1990); Commonwealth v. Bums, 395 S.E.2d
456, 458-460 (Va. 1990); Hamer v. School Board, 393 S.E.2d 623, 625-626 (Va. 1990); Hess v.
Snyder Hunt Corp., 392 S.E.2d 817, 820-821(Va.1990); R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Committee
for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 391 S.E.2d 587, 591 (Va. 1990); Mu'min v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 886, 890-891, 892-893 (Va. 1990); Smith v. Commonwealth, 389 S.E.2d 871,
876 (Va. 1990); Occoquan Land Development Corp. v. Cooper, 389 S.E.2d 464, 467 (Va. 1990).
Only in R.G. Moore and Hess did the court clearly state whether its analysis was based on the
federal or state constitutions.
91. 397 S.E.2d 837 (Va. 1990).
92. Of 21 arguably relevant constitutional decisions, 9 (43%) failed to specify whether the
constitution under discussion was the state or federal one. State v. Byrd, 568 So. 2d 554, 560-61
(La. 1990) (scope of search warrant); State v. Roberts, 568 So. 2d 1017, 1019 (La. 1990) (due
process/"fundamental fairness"); Louisiana State Bar Assn. v. Keys, 567 So. 2d 588, 591 (La.
1990) (due process); Palermo Land Co. v. Planning Commn., 561 So. 2d 482, 491-96 (La. 1990)
(due process); State v. Burrell, 561 So. 2d 692, 698-99 (La. 1990) (fair trial/change of venue),
cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991); State v. Wille, 559 So. 2d 1321, 1335-36, 1338-39 (La. 1990)
(vagueness, ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Lee, 559 So. 2d 1310, 1313-15 (La. 1990)
(exclusion of blacks from venire); State v. Jones, 558 So. 2d 546, 551-52 (La. 1990) (vagueness);
Caracci v. Louisiana State Racing Commn., 556 So. 2d 1249 (La. 1990) (due process).
93. Almost all of the 36 decisions rendered by the California Supreme Court in 1990 that
handled state constitutional issues were death penalty appeals. While the death penalty review
cases of the California Supreme Court are noteworthy for their clarity and thoroughness, the
court still issued 23 opinions in which at least one constitutional issue was analyzed without any
indication of whether the constitutional analysis was based on the federal or state constitution.
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their constitutional rulings, although to a somewhat lesser extent.
The Kansas Supreme Court has raised ambiguity about the constitutional basis of judicial rulings to something of an art form. In 13 out
of 21 relevant cases, the court referred to some sort of constitutional
right without specifying its source.94 To further confuse things, in 6
cases the court held opaquely that it "adopted" the relevant federal
standard.95 For example, in State v. Prewett96 the court discussed a
People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 393, 397, 398, 401, 402, 413-15 (Cal. 1990) (ineffective assistance
of counsel), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3359 (1991); People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 353-57 (Cal.
1990) (prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 116 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991); People v. Kaurish, 802
P.2d 278, 289-90, 305-06 (Cal. 1990) (prosecutorial misconduct, inadequate assistance of counsel,
equal protection), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 121 (1991); People v. Gallego, 802 P.2d 169, 188-89,
192-93, 204-06 (Cal. 1990) (waiver of counsel, venue/fair trial, prosecutorial misconduct), cert
denied, 116 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991); People v. Anderson, 801 P.2d 1107, 1112-14, 1116-18 (Cal.
1990) (dilution of juror sense of responsibility, prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
148 (1991); People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1202-03 (Cal. 1990) (ineffective assistance of
counsel), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 117 (1991); In re Crooks, 800 P.2d 898 (Cal. 1990)(due process,
double jeopardy); People v. Ortiz, 800 P.2d 547, 552, 555-56 (Cal. 1990) (right to counsel, due
process); People v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 516, 530-31, 533-34, 537-39 (Cal. 1990) (venue/fair trial,
juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 117 (1991); People v. Medina, 799
P.2d 1282, 1297-99, 1303 (Cal. 1990) (prosecutorial misconduct, "right to be personally present"), cert. granted in part and motion granted, 116 L. Ed. 2d 276 (1991); People v. Frank, 798
P.2d 1215, 1221, 1223, 1225-26 (Cal. 1990) (double jeopardy, ineffective assistance of counsel,
prosecutorial misconduct), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2816 (1991); People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561,
580-81 (Cal. 1990) (due process), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2249 (1991); People v. Rodriguez, 795
P.2d 783 (Cal. 1990) (due process); People v. Stankewitz, 793 P.2d 23, 43-44, 45, 50-53 (Cal.
1990) (juror bias, discriminatory peremptory challenges, ineffective assistance of counsel), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 1432 (1991); People v. Gordon, 792 P.2d 251, 263-64, 271 (Cal. 1990) (fair
trial, prosecutorial misconduct), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1123 (1991); People v. Ramirez, 791
P.2d 965, 981, 984-85 (Cal. 1990) (waiver of right to cross-examination, ineffective assistance of
counsel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1025 (1991); Dahlman v. State Bar, 790 P.2d 1322, 1325 (Cal.
1990) (due process); People v. Miller, 790 P.2d 1289, 1314-15, 1317-18 (Cal. 1990) (prosecutorial
misconduct, unfair trial), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 713 (1991); People v. Mattson, 789 P.2d 983,
1017-18 (Cal.) (ineffective assistance of counsel), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 591 (1990); People v.
Clark, 789 P.2d 127, 135-36, 158-59 (Cal.) (voir dire/juror bias, prosecutorial misconduct), modified, 50 Cal. 3d 1157a, cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 442 (1990); People v. Douglas, 788 P.2d 640, 65153, 674-75, 682 (Cal. 1990) (fair trial, double jeopardy, ineffective assistance of counsel); People
v. Lewis, 786 P.2d 892, 907-08 (Cal. 1990) (ineffective assistance of counsel); People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 874-77 (Cal.) (voluntariness of confession), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 226 (1990).
94. State v. White, 785 P.2d 950, 954, 956 (Kan. 1990) (coerced confession; harmless error);
State v. Pioletti, 785 P.2d 963, 975, 976 (Kan. 1990) (double jeopardy; prosecutorial misconduct); State v. Graham, 799 P.2d 1003 (Kan. 1990) (admissibility of statements); State v. Wesson, 802 P.2d 574, 581(Kan.1990) (double jeopardy), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2866 (1991); State
v. Weis, 792 P.2d 989, 991, 992 (Kan. 1990) (seizure); State v. Alires, 792 P.2d 1019, 1022 (Kan.
1990) (suggestive identification); State v. Searles, 793 P.2d 724, 728, 732, 733 (Kan. 1990) (due
process; double jeopardy); State v. Probst, 795 P.2d 393 (Kan. 1990) (suppression issue); State v.
Bailey, 799 P.2d 977 (Kan. 1990) (validity of stop); State v. Prewett, 785 P.2d 956, 961 (Kan.
1990) (suppression); State v. Toler, 787 P.2d 711, 714, 715 (Kan. 1990) (warrant validity); State
v. Jones, 787 P.2d 726, 727 (Kan. 1990) (admissibility of statement); State v. Massey, 795 P.2d
344, 348 (Kan. 1990) (representative jury).
95. State v. Smith, 799 P.2d 497, 501 (Kan. 1990); State v. Massey, 795 P.2d 344, 348 (Kan.
1990); State v. Searles, 793 P.2d 724, 728 (Kan. 1990); State v. Jones, 787 P.2d 726, 728 (Kan.
1990); State v. Toler, 787 P.2d 711, 716 (Kan. 1990); State v. Prewett, 785 P.2d 956, 961 (Kan.
1990).
96. 785 P.2d 956 (Kan. 1990).
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rule announced by the U.S. Supreme Court under the Fourth Amendment, and then said that the standard so announced "has been approved by this court. " 97 Otherwise, the case contains no indication as
to whether the ruling is one under the state or federal constitution, or
both. Of course, one might speculate that the court would have no
reason to "approve" a U.S. Supreme Court standard if it were merely
applying binding federal law, so the use of this language demonstrates
the state constitutional basis of the holding. Things are not that clear,
however. The court in Prewett nowhere mentioned the state constitution, nor did it make any Michigan v. Long statement, or use any other
kind of language that could be construed as an attempt to insulate the
decision from further review. Moreover, although the court cited one
of its previous decisions to support its contention that it had adopted
the federal standard, that case contains precisely the same ambiguity
concerning the basis of the court's ruling as Prewett itself. 98

4. Lockstep Analysis
One reason state courts may fail to specify when constitutional rulings rest on state or federal grounds is that it so often seems not to
matter because the two documents have exactly the same meaning they have been interpreted in what is sometimes called "lockstep." 99
For example, in 11 of the 22 Massachusetts cases in which litigants
raised both state and federal constitutional claims, the court held that
the relevant analysis and result were the same under both constitutions on the facts of the case. Thus, the constitutional standards that
will be applied in Massachusetts to some types of due process, 100 fair
trial, 101 use immunity, 102 and ineffective assistance of counsel
97. 785 P.2d at 961.
98. State v. Walter, 670 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Kan. 1983). To make matters worse, Walter refers
approvingly to a prior Kansas lower court decision "adopting" the federal rule. State v. Rose,
665 P.2d 1111 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983). That case, apparently the source of the chain of ambiguity
in this line of cases, describes the reason for its ruling as follows:
We have no reason to believe the Kansas Supreme Court would •.• hold that the Kansas
Constitution requires Kansas to adopt a rule similar to that in [prior U.S. Supreme Court
cases]. Thus, all prior Kansas decisions ••• inconsistent with [a very recent Supreme Court
case that modified the rule announced in the prior cases] will no longer be followed by this
court.
665 P.2d at 1115. It is still unclear from this statement whether Rose is a decision under the
federal or state constitution, or both.
99. See Brennan, Bill of Rights, supra note 1, at 550-51; Maltz, supra note 38.
100. Care and Protection of Robert, 556 N.E.2d 993 (Mass. 1990) (standard of proof for loss
of custody); Opinion of the Justices, 563 N.E.2d 203 (Mass. 1990) (protection of property
interests).
101. Commonwealth v. Gagnon, 557 N.E.2d 728 (Mass. 1990) (right to present evidence).
102. Commonwealth v. Kerr, 563 N.E.2d 1364 (Mass. 1990).
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claims, 103 as well as to a wide variety of search and seizure issues, 104
are identical under the state and federal constitutions. Moreover, in
another 5 cases adjudicating claims relying solely on the state constitution, the court nevertheless looked to federal law for guidance, and
applied an analysis used by federal courts under the federal Constitution.105 These cases suggest that participants in the Massachusetts
legal system, including the Supreme Judicial Court, have no particular
need to distinguish clearly between the state and federal constitutions,
because the two documents to a large extent have the same meaning
and can thus be used interchangeably.
Much the same is true in other states. In the only 2 Virginia cases
explicitly presenting alternative claims under the federal and state constitutions, the court held that the same result obtained under the federal and state constitutions. 106 Similarly, in 6 Louisiana cases where
state and federal constitutional claims were raised separately, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that the relevant analysis and the outcome
were the same under both constitutions. 107
California presents an interesting example of the tendency to interpret state and federal constitutions in lockstep. The California Constitution provides: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not
dependent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution." 108
This provision stands as an open invitation to the development of an
independent state constitutional jurisprudence. In 1990, there was no
sign that this invitation had been taken up: in 14 of the 15 cases where
litigants raised both state and federal constitutional challenges to the
same government action, the court reached precisely the same result
103. Commonwealth v. Cardenuto, 548 N.E.2d 864 (Mass. 1990).
104. Commonwealth v. Wunder, 556 N.E.2d 65 (Mass. 1990) (probable cause); Commonwealth v. Cast, 556 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990) (exception to warrant requirement); Commonwealth
v. Moses, 557 N.E.2d 14 (Mass. 1990) (stop and frisk); Commonwealth v. Tart, 557 N.E.2d 1123
(Mass. 1990) (warrantless administrative search involving request to produce state permit); Commonwealth v. Price, 562 N.E.2d 1355 (Mass. 1990) (standing to challenge search).
105. Commonwealth v. Allen, 549 N.E.2d 430 (Mass. 1990) (probable cause); Commonwealth v. Melendez, 551 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1990) (suppression); Commonwealth v. Bray, 553
N.E.2d 538 (Mass. 1990) (retroactivity of decision for purposes of jury instruction); O'Connor v.
Police Commr., 557 N.E.2d 1146 (Mass. 1990) (urinalysis); Gauthier v. Police Commr., 557
N.E.2d 1374 (Mass. 1990) (urinalysis).
106. Hess v. Snyder Hunt Corp., 392 S.E.2d 817 (Va. 1990); R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Committee for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 391 S.E.2d 587 (Va. 1990).
107. Moresi v. Department of Wildlife and Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990) (existence
of civil damages action directly under state constitution for unconstitutional searches and
seizures); Paillet v. Wooton, 559 So. 2d 758 (La. 1990) (procedural due process); State in Interest
of J.A.V., 558 So. 2d 214 (La. 1990) (due process/statutory vagueness); State ex rel. Adams v.
Butler, 558 So. 2d 552 (La. 1990) (double jeopardy); Gulf States Utils. Co. v. Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Commn., 556 So. 2d 573 (La. 1990) (due process); In re Adoption ofB.G.S., 556 So. 2d 545
(La. 1990) (due process).
108. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24.

790

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 90:761

under both constitutions. This constitutional congruity extended to
issues involving the right to a public trial, 109 the disproportionality of
a death sentence, 11o the right to a representative jury, 111 juror bias regarding the death penalty, 112 the right to counsel, 113 suppression of
involuntary confessions, 114 inadequate assistance of counsel, 115 due
process rights,116 the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges, 117
and the right to confront witnesses. 118 In 5 additional cases, the court
held the state and federal constitutions to have identical meanings by
force of the operation of California's Proposition 8, a constitutional
amendment dramatically limiting the scope of the state's exclusionary
rule.119
109. People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 867-68 (Cal. 1990).
110. People v. Turner, 789 P.2d 887, 916 (Cal. 1990); People v. Marshall, 790 P.2d 676, 69192 (Cal. 1990).
111. People v. Mattson, 789 P.2d 983, 994-95 (Cal. 1990); People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561,
569 (Cal. 1990).
112. Mattson, 789 P.2d at 995-97; Sanders, 797 P.2d at 577.
113. Mattson, 789 P.2d at 1011-13.
114. Marshal/, 790 P.2d at 683; People v. Benson, 802 P.2d 330, 343 (Cal. 1990); People v.
Gallego, 802 P.2d 169, 201-02 (Cal. 1990). The last case was a pre-Proposition 8 case, so the
court held that the state and federal constitutions required the same result on the facts of the case
even before Proposition 8 intervened to prevent such an analysis. See infra note 119.
115. Marshal/, 790 P.2d at 698-99; In re Fields, 800 P.2d 862 (Cal. 1990).
116. People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1172-73 (Cal. 1990); People v. Medina, 799 P.2d
1282, 1288-91 (Cal. 1990); People v. Frank, 798 P.2d 1215 (Cal. 1990); San Diego County Dept.
of Social Servs. v. Russell S., 795 P.2d 1244, 1251-53 (Cal. 1990); People v. Jones, 792 P.2d 643,
656-58 (Cal. 1990).
117. People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 574 (Cal. 1990); People v. Hayes, 802 P.2d 376, 391-92
(Cal. 1990).
118. Frank, 798 P.2d at 1221.
119. People v. Thompson, 785 P.2d 857, 874 (Cal. 1990); People v. Luttenberger, 784 P.2d
633, 639 (Cal. 1990); People v. Prather, 787 P.2d 1012 (Cal. 1990); People v. Douglas, 788 P.2d
640, 654-55 (Cal. 1990); People v. Kelly, 800 P.2d 516, 525-30 (Cal. 1990). Although the results
in these cases may be correct, the court's reasoning is almost certainly wrong, and illustrates the
degree to which the current California Supreme Court has become attached to federal constitutional law.
Proposition 8, also known as the Victims' Bill of Rights, Prather, 787 P.2d at 1014, was
adopted by initiative in 1982. The provision quite simply forbids the exclusion of "relevant evidence" in criminal cases, CAL. CoNST. art. I, § 28(d); it is, in essence, a constitutional repeal of
the state's exclusionary rule. See Wilkes, supra note 6 (arguing that state constitutional amendment process has been used to limit the state constitutional rights of criminal defendants). or
course, so long as the federal Constitution forbids the introduction of some types of evidence, not
all evidence of guilt will be admitted, but such exclusions will be the result of federal, not state
constitutional restrictions.
Rather than interpreting the proposition to sweep away the exclusionary rule as a matter of
state law - its obvious purpose - the court has interpreted it to cut down state constitutional
protections only as far as the minimum level of federal protections. In re Lance W., 694 P.2d 744
(Cal. 1985); People v. Luttenberger, 784 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1990). While this will of course be the
practical result of any case in which a defendant invokes the exclusionary rule as a matter of state
and federal constitutional law, such a result should come about not because both constitutions
provide the same protection but because the state constitution provides none and the federal
Constitution sets a mandatory floor by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Collins,
supra note 25, at 15 ("There is no constitutional impediment preventing state courts from grant-
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Like ambiguity regarding the basis of a constitutional ruling, lockstep analysis of the state constitution discourages the development of
an independent state constitutional discourse. First, it discourages
participants in the legal system from making arguments ·clearly and
distinctly based on the state constitution by reducing the potential
benefit from effort invested in developing such an argument. Indeed,
because the federal Constitution is generally more fully elaborated
than its state counterparts, lockstep analysis tends to elevate federal
law into the law of choice for the interpretation of the state constitution; it provides a generous source of off-the-shelf standards and analyses for application to state constitutional problems. Second, lockstep
analysis is conducive to the perception that the state constitution is
some sort of redundancy - that it is a source of law that has no particular value or purpose and therefore need not be taken seriously.
When state constitutional arguments come to be seen as "garbage arguments," 120 the likelihood that litigants or courts will devote much
attention to the state constitution is drastically reduced.
Nevertheless, the mere congruity of state and federal constitutional
outcomes need not by itself produce these results. The wording of
many state constitutional provisions is identical to or closely approximates the wording of corresponding federal provisions, and the historical roots of state constitutions often intertwine with those of the
national document; as Chief Justice David Brock of the New Hampshire Supreme Court has noted, certain striking similarities between
the construction given the state and federal constitutions are "logical,
given their common ancestry." 121 In these circumstances, it might
well be unremarkable if state and federal constitutional law overlapped
to a considerable extent. This possibility underlies in part the appeal
of the interstitial approach to state constitutional interpretation: because there is a strong likelihood of doctrinal similarity, it is argued,
courts should start with the federal analysis and deviate from it only
ing a lesser degree of protection under state [constitutional] law, provided only that these courts
then ... apply ... the federal Constitution ••.."). What the court seems to forget is that it is
permissible in our system for a state constitution to provide less protection than the U.S. Constitution, as well as more. Indeed, the only case the court decided in 1990 in which it held the state
constitution to provide broader protections than the federal Constitution involved application of
standards that preceded the adoption of Proposition 8, and which no longer apply in California.
People v. Gonzalez, 800 P.2d 1159, 1169 n.3 (Cal. 1990).
120. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1162 (quoting Eric Klumb, Comment, The Independent
Application of State Constitutional Provisions to Questions of Criminal Procedure, 62 MARQ. L.
REV. 596, 620 n.145 (1979)).
121. State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710, 720 (N.H. 1990) (Brock, C.J., concurring); see also
Kaye, supra note 5, at 412 ("Common objectives, common drafters and common models naturally engender common texts.").
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for clearly defined reasons. 122 Yet not even devotees of the interstitial
approach suggest that state courts should indiscriminately copy federal analysis into state constitutional law. If state deviations from federal constitutional law may be justified only by textual, historical, or
political factors specific to the state constitution, 123 it follows that doctrinal similarities must be justified by the absence of such factors.
Thus, it is not necessarily lockstep interpretation itself that suppresses
state constitutional discourse so much as unexplained lockstep
interpretation.
Do state courts explain adequately the reasons for lockstep rulings? I suspect that by now the reader will be unsurprised to learn
that they do not; in fact, state courts almost never explain the basis for
lockstep rulings. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court did not
explain the congruity of outcomes in the 2 lockstep cases it decided,
except to assert in one case that "we refuse to give any broader interpretation" to the state constitution's due process guarantee. 124 The
Kansas Supreme Court decided 4 cases in lockstep with federal constitutional law; 125 in none of these cases did the court say much more
than that the state constitution affords "the same protections" as, 126 or
is "identical in scope" to, 127 the federal Constitution. The situation
was much the same in New York. In People v. Hernandez, 128 for example, the court held that the federal and state equal protection
clauses produced the same result; the court's only explanation for this
congruity was its assertion, without further elaboration, that "no justification for breaking new ground as to [the state] clause ... is sufficiently advanced."129
These conclusory rulings do not provide participants in the legal
system with any way to recognize situations in which the state constitution should be understood to be similar to the federal Constitution.
The litigant who asks why the two documents have the same meaning
in a particular case is told by the court, in effect, "they just do." Such
122. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
123. See Pollock, supra note 2, at 718-19.
124. R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v. Committee for the Repeal of Ordinance R(C)-88-13, 391
S.E.2d 587, 591 (Va. 1990).
125. State v. Wesson, 802 P.2d 574 (Kan. 1990); Love v. One 1967 Chevrolet El Camino, 799
P.2d 1043 (Kan. 1990); State v. Hall, 793 P.2d 737 (Kan. 1990); In re Lucas, 789 P.2d 1157
(Kan. 1990).
126. Lucas, 189 P.2d at 1160.
127. Love, 199 P.2d at 1048.
128. 552 N.E.2d 621 (N.Y. 1990).
129. 552 N.E.2d at 624.
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a response makes any kind of further debate about the relative meanings of the state and federal constitutions a virtual impossibility.
5. Silence on State Constitutional History
If state constitutional law lacks a discourse of constitutional simi. larity, it also largely lacks a discourse of constitutional distinctness,
something that members of the interstitial school of New Federalism
hold to be a requirement of proper state constitutional adjudication. 130
For example, state constitutional history is a factor often cited as a
legitimate basis for interpreting state constitutional provisions differently from their federal counterparts, yet state courts almost never resort to the state's constitutional history in the way that federal courts
routinely do.
Consider the Massachusetts Constitution, which dates to 1780 and
is the oldest continually operative constitution in the United States. 131
The state constitution was drafted primarily by John Adams, a pivotal
figure in the nation's founding, and the author of a treatise on constitutional law that heavily influenced thinking about constitutions during the period following independence. 132 One might expect Adams'
views to play a pivotal role in the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court's constitutional jurisprudence, and to furnish the basis for divergent interpretations of the state constitution to the extent that Adams'
views differed from those of the federal Constitution's Framers. Yet
the court has almost never mentioned Adams for any purpose; 133 indeed, one would never know from reading the court's decisions that
the Massachusetts Constitution had any kind of history at all. 134
As with Massachusetts, the Virginia court has been strangely silent
on the state's constitutional history. The Virginia Declaration of
130. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
131. Sturm, supra note 69, at 75.
132. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 17761787, at 567-68 (1969).
133. A computer search of Supreme Judi~ial Court decisions, unrestricted by date, revealed
only six cases in which the court mentioned John Adams, and in most of these the mention is
peripheral to resolution of the case. See Commonwealth v. Sheppard, 441 N.E.2d 725, 742
(Mass. 1982) (concurring opinion), revd. sub nom. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981
(1984); Commonwealth v. St. Germain, 408 N.E.2d 1358, 1366 n.18 (Mass. 1980); Commonwealth v. Cundriff', 415 N.E.2d 172, 177 (Mass. 1980); Opinion of the Justices, 309 N.E.2d 476,
480 n.5 (Mass. 1974); Opinion of the Justices, 271 N.E.2d 335, 341 (Mass. 1971); Parker v.
Simpson, 62 N.E. 401, 407 (1902).
134. In addition to the paucity of references to John Adams, a computer search of Supreme
Judicial Court decisions, unrestricted by date, revealed that the court has never mentioned Elbridge Gerry or Rufus King, and has mentioned Samuel Adams only once. Commonwealth v.
Nissenbaum, 536 N.E.2d 592, 596 n.5 (Mass. 1989). All were leading figures during the founding period and signers of the Declaration of Independence or federal Constitution.
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Rights was drafted by George Mason, and James Madison later used it
as a model for the federal Bill of Rights. One might think that Mason's views would carry some weight in Virginia's construction of its
own Declaration of Rights, yet the Virginia Supreme Court appears to
have consulted Mason's views only once since 1925 135 - far fewer
times than the U.S. Supreme Court has turned to Mason. 136 Thomas
Jefferson's name is similarly missing from the Virginia Supreme
Court's jurisprudence. 137 Like Sherlock Holmes' dog that did not
bark in the night, 138 the court's silence seems significant; the court
treats the state constitution, when it treats it at all, like some kind of
ahistorical, authorless text. 139 In so doing, it limits greatly the available ways of talking about the state constitution, thus constraining the
scope of any potential state constitutional discourse. 140
Similarly, Louisiana possesses a unique Spanish and French heritage that could easily account for potentially significant differences between the state and federal constitutions, especially given that it
accounts for Louisiana's adherence to the civil law rather than the
common law, a feature of the legal landscape shared by no other
American state. But the constitutional decisions of the Louisiana
Supreme Court give no hint of this unique historical and legal background. Nor is there anything in California state constitutional rulings to suggest that the state was settled under frontier conditions that
differed, perhaps significantly, from the conditions under which eastern seaboard states were founded. In short, the state constitutional
discourse of distinctness predicted by New Federalism has largely
failed to materialize.
B. Exceptions
Although the general trends in state constitutional law contradict
the claims of New Federalism, proponents of New Federalism might
135. Reid v. Gholson, 327 S.E.2d 107, 112 n.10 (Va. 1985). This reference was found by
performing a computer search, unrestricted by date, of the opinions of the Virginia Supreme
Court contained in a database that includes opinions going back to 1925.
136. Among the many such decisions, see, for example, Welch v. Texas Dept. of Highways &
Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 483 (1987); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 n.10 (1983); Mc·
Daniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 629 n.9 (1978); Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 770 n.28 (1973).
137. An unrestricted computer search of Virginia high court decisions turned up only one
relevant reference, and a minor one at that. See Chaves v. Johnson, 335 S.E.2d 97, 102 (Va.
1985) (quoting one short passage from Jefferson's first inaugural address).
138. Pace Marshall J. Tinkle, State Constitutional Law in Maine: At the Crossroads, 13 VT.
L. REv. 61, 67 (1988).
139. I am indebted to my colleague Don Korobkin for this observation.
140. Cf. supra note 69.
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take comfort from a few exceptions, which I re'view here for that reason. Occasionally, state courts do diverge from federal law or engage
in independent state constitutional analysis. However, even these exceptions often tum out on closer examination to represent less of a
departure from the general trends than seems apparent at first glance.
1.

Divergences from Federal Law

State courts of course do not always interpret the state constitution
in lockstep with federal law; occasionally they strike out on their own,
a development that New Federalism advocates generally applaud. 141
The sample surveyed here contains several examples of such divergences. However, the existence of divergent holdings does not necessarily indicate a healthy state constitutional discourse.
Let us return to New York, which again is fairly representative of
the sample states as a group. In 1990, the New York Court of Appeals
held in 4 cases that the state constitution provides greater protection
of individual rights than does the federal Constitution. 142 Consider
People v. Dunn. 143 There, a criminal defendant challenged a search
under the state and federal constitutions. The court began its opinion
by analyzing the claim under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, and held that no search had occurred as a matter of federal
constitutional law. 144 Apparently following a more or less interstitial
approach, the court then turned explicitly to the state constitutional
claim. So far, so good; the court's analysis is systeµiatic, and would
clearly be insulated from Supreme Court review under Michigan v.
Long.
The court framed the relevant state constitutional question as
whether it should adopt as a matter of state constitutional law the
analysis of the controlling federal case. 145 The court then pointed out
that it had interpreted the state constitution independently from the
federal Constitution in the past, and concluded that it would do so
141. See supra note SS and accompanying text. The existence of state decisions that diverge
from federal Jaw seems to be considered a major empirical indicator of state court independence.
142. People v. Dunn, S64 N.E.2d 10S4 (N.Y. 1990); People v. Van Pelt, SS6 N.E.2d 423
(N.Y. 1990); People v. Vilardi, SSS N.E.2d 91S (N.Y. 1990); People v. Davis, SS3 N.E.2d 1008
(N.Y. 1990).
143. S64 N.E.2d 10S4 (N.Y. 1990).
144. S64 N.E.2d at 10S6-S7.
14S. S64 N.E.2d at 10S7. This approach should not be confused with a proper interstitial
approach to state constitutional interpretation. Proponents of the interstitial approach do not
suggest that state courts decide whether a federal rule should be adopted as the state law based
on the merits of the federal rule; rather, they urge state courts to adopt whatever rule an independent construction of the state constitution requires, but to do so only when required to
reach the state constitutional issue. See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
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again here. 146 The heart of its analysis is contained in a footnote.
"Unlike the Supreme Court," the New York court thought the analysis under the state constitution should have a different "focus" from
controlling Fourth Amendment precedent. 147 The proper focus, it
said, was contained in a particular federal circuit court opinion which
the New York court found "persuasive." 148 However, the court in no
way explained what about this case was persuasive, or why a federal
court discussing the federal Constitution should be understood to be
saying anything persuasive about the New York Constitution. The
New York court went on to cite a dissenting Supreme Court opinion
by Justice Brennan, as well as some previously decided New York
cases, before concluding that a search had occurred under the state
constitutional standard, although the defendant's state constitutional
rights had not been violated by that search. 149
Consider this case for a moment from the perspective of state constitutional discourse. Suppose you are a criminal defense lawyer.
Your client was arrested by New York police as the result of a search
that is factually distinguishable from the circumstances of Dunn. You
want to move to suppress the fruits of the search, and you are quite
certain that such a motion will fail under controlling Supreme Court
precedent interpreting the Fourth Amendment. When you bring the
motion, you therefore include a claim under the New York Constitution which, you argue, provides broader protections to criminal defendants than the Fourth Amendment. In light of Dunn, what kind of
an argument can you craft?
Certainly you cannot use Dunn to support any kind of argument
suggesting that differences in the text, framers' intent, or founding history of the state constitution justify a different result. Indeed, as far as
appears from Dunn, such arguments have not the slightest currency
with the Court of Appeals. You can perhaps imitate the winning approach in Dunn by finding old federal lower court cases that went
your way before the Supreme Court ruled against the position you
advocate, and you may find good language from the dissenters in the
relevant Supreme Court cases - but what can you say about these
rulings? That they are "persuasive"? Suppose the prosecutor says:'
"No, they're not persuasive. The majority Supreme Court opinion is
much more persuasive." How can you respond?
The truth is, you cannot respond. Although Dunn provides you
146.
147.
148.
149.

564
564
564
564

N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d
N.E.2d

at
at
at
at

1057.
1057-58.
1058 n.4.
1058.
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with plenty of ideas for assertions, it provides nothing useful for argument. You can assert that the state constitution is more protective
than the Fourth Amendment; you can assert that the New York
courts have been willing to depart from federal analyses in the past;
you can assert that some case favorable to you is persuasive; but you
can neither back up these assertions with arguments if challenged, nor
explain why the assertions are relevant to and properly describe your
particular case. At bottom, Dunn furnishes the litigant with no language in which to engage in intelligible debate with an opponent or
with a judge over the meaning of the state constitution. At best, the
participants who want to engage in such a debate - and a criminal
defendant may want desperately to do so - can make a series of
counterassertions about the meaning of the constitution. But an exchange of conflicting assertions about the constitution does not
amount to a meaningful constitutional discourse.1 50
The situation is much the same in Massachusetts. Although the
Supreme Judicial Court decided 3 cases in 1990 holding that the state
constitution provides broader protection of individual rights than the
federal Constitution, 151 its opinions reveal no intelligible discourse of
distinctness on which litigants could rely in order to build effective
arguments concerning the ways in which the state and federal constitutions differ.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Amendola, 152 the court adopted
as a matter of state constitutional law the federal Fourth Amendment
automatic standing rule, a rule that the U.S. Supreme Court announced in a 1960 case, 153 but recently abandoned. 154 The court's
only explanation for departing from what appears to be its usual practice of following current federal Fourth Amendment law was that the
concerns of the earlier Supreme Court decision "remain valid today,
150. To like effect is People v. Davis, 553 N.E.2d 1008 (N.Y. 1990), another case in which
the court diverged from federal holdings. There, the court considered a right to counsel claim
under the state and federal constitutions. Although the court held that the New York constitution provided broader protection than the federal, and cited contrasting state and federal cases to
prove it, the court never said why or in what way the state constitution provided enhanced
protection. 553 N.E.2d at 1010-11. Rather, it simply concluded that the case should come out in
a certain way, which is to say that it made an assertion of its own, unsupported by the elements
of constitutional discourse to which other participants in the legal system might be able to respond intelligibly. 553 N.E.2d at 1011-13.
151. Commonwealth v. Amendola, 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v.
Melendez, 551 N.E.2d 514 (Mass. 1990); Commonwealth v. Lyons, 564 N.E.2d 390 (Mass.
1990).
152. 550 N.E.2d 121 (Mass. 1990).
153. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
154. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980).
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despite the current Supreme Court's shift in thinking." 155 This ruling
prompted a dissent from Justice Nolan, who criticized the court for
departing from settled federal law "without so much as a plausible
argument that the Massachusetts Constitution requires the
expansion." 156
Amendola provides little basis for participants in the Massachusetts legal system to do much more than make assertions and counterassertions about the meaning of the state constitution; it does not
contribute meaningfully to any discourse of constitutional distinctness.
And even if the comes language about the "concerns" of a prior federal decision could be parlayed into some kind of debate, there is nevertheless a distinctly hit-or-miss feeling to the court's decisions on
whether to adhere to or depart from federal holdings. Thus, in Commonwealth v. Cote, 157 the court said in response to a claim of state
constitutional distinctness that the state constitution may "afford more
substantive protection" than the federal Constitution, 158 and found
that the issue under scrutiny raised "a closer question" under the state
constitution than under the federal, but ended up rejecting the claim of
distinctness without any useful explanation. 159 Likewise, in Commonwealth v. Cast, 160 the court acknowledged that the state constitution
provided "greater protection against unlawful search and seizure"
than its federal counterpart, but held against the defendant anyway
because the defendant had offered no reason to support his contention
that more protection should be available on the facts of the particular
case.161
Again, these cases are virtually useless from the perspective of
state constitutional discourse. There is really no plausible way to look
at Amendola, Cote, and Cast and build any kind of intelligible argument about why the Massachusetts Constitution required a departure
from the federal approach in one but not the others. Prosecutors and
defense counsel can use these cases only to contradict each other, not
to debate the meaning of the state constitution.

lSS.
1S6.
1S7.
1S8.
1987)).
1S9.
160.
161.

SSO N.E.2d at 12S.
SSO N.E.2d at 127.
SS6 N.E.2d 4S (Mass. 1990).
SS6 N.E.2d at SO (quoting Commonwealth v. Blood, S07·N.E.2d 1029, 1033 n.9 (Mass.
SS6 N.E.2d at SO.
SS6 N.E.2d 69 (Mass. 1990).
SS6 N.E.2d at 79, 79-80.
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2. Independent Analysis

The cases that most closely support the claims of New Federalism
are those in which state courts engaged in true independent analysis of
the state constitution using the traditional tools of constitutional interpretation. A potentially promising bright spot is Louisiana, where in a
substantial minority of cases the Louisiana Supreme Court approached state constitutional questions more systematically and thoroughly than the cases discussed above. In 8 1990 cases - nearly 40%
of the total state constitutional cases decided - the court seemed noticeably more willing not only to acknowledge that it was being asked
by litigants to construe the state constitution, but actually to honor the
request. 162 The cases in this subset of the court's decisions are not
always as thorough or as systematic as they could be, nor do they
generally contain the type of Long language necessary to insulate them
from further review. Nevertheless, the tone of these opinions suggests
that the Louisiana Supreme Court will take state constitutional claims
seriously at least some of the time.
For example, in Department of Transportation and Development v.
Dietrich, 163 the court considered a question arising under the eminent
domain provisions of the state constitution. Although the court's
analysis was brief, it included consideration of the text of the relevant
provision of the 1974 constitution, that provision's predecessor in the
previous constitution, and some judicial precedent relevant to the construction of the provision. 164 Dietrich thus provides some guidance to
participants in the legal system concerning the proper way to talk
about the meaning of the constitution; presumably, a litigant will be
able in a future case to craft an argument, if one is available, based on
the text of a provision of the current constitution and its counterpart
in the previous constitution.
In 3 other cases from this group, the court performed something
like the type of analysis one might expect to find in a robust constitutional discourse, discussing the text and history of constitutional provisions, the structure of the state constitution, prior state judicial
162. State v. Miller, 571 So. 2d 603 (La. 1990) (double jeopardy); Moresi v. Department of
Wildlife & Fisheries, 567 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990) (civil remedies for unconstitutional search and
seizure); Moore v. Roemer, 567 So. 2d 75 (La. 1990) (judicial jurisdiction); Williams v. Ragland,
567 So. 2d 63 (La. 1990) (judicial retirement); State v. Green, 566 So. 2d 623 (La. 1990) (method
of appointing state ethics board); State v. Spellman, 562 So. 2d 455 (La. 1990) (due process);
State v. Burrell, 561 So. 2d 692 (La. 1990) (right to notice of aggravating circumstances); Department of Transp. & Dev. v. Dietrich, 555 So. 2d 1355 (La. 1990) (eminent domain).
163. 555 So. 2d 1355 (La. 1990).
164. 555 So. 2d at 1358-59.
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decisions, and the understanding of the provisions' framers. 165 The
high courts of Kansas, 166 Massachusetts, 167 and New York 168 also decided a small number of cases that treated state constitutional claims
with comparable respect.
3.

The California Caseload

This subsection and the next examine briefly some peculiarities of
specific states that make them exceptions of sorts to the general trends
outlined in the previous section.
Two unusual aspects of the California Supreme Court's caseload
complicate any attempts to generalize about its state constitutional decisions. First, it seems that the majority of the cases in which the
California court wrote analytical opinions involved only two kinds of
disputes: mandatory death penalty appeals, all of which involved multiple issues of federal and state constitutional law; and attorney discipline cases, of which only a handful involved constitutional issues.
Thus, the court's caseload may not provide a representative sample of
issues arising under the state constitution.
Second, many if not most of the state constitutional issues facing
the court arose from provisions incorporated into the state constitution by popular initiative rather than by constitutional convention or
ratification of legislatively proposed amendments. The California
Supreme Court has plainly adopted an interpretive approach to such
constitutional provisions that treats them more like statutes than constitutional provisions. That is, the court tends to rely heavily on the
16S. See Moresi v. Department of Wildlife & Fisheries, S67 So. 2d 1081 (La. 1990); Moore v.
Roemer, S67 So. 2d 7S (La. 1990); Williams v. Ragland, S67 So. 2d 63 (La. 1990).
166. See Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Board of County Commrs., 802 P.2d S84 (Kan.
1990); Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d S41 (Kan. 1990).
167. See Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Commn., S64 N.E.2d S71 (Mass. 1990);
Opinions of the Justices, SS6 N.E.2d 1002 (Mass. 1990); Collins v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, SS6 N.E.2d 348 (Mass. 1990).
168. See People v. Ohrenstein, S6S N.E.2d 493, 498-99 (N.Y. 1990) (discussing history and
purpose of provision prohibiting use of public money for private undertakings and relying on
previous New York cases, some of them very old, to interpret provision); People v. Van Pelt, SS6
N.E.2d 423 (N.Y. 1990) (concluding that state constitution provides broader protection of individual rights than federal Constitution and resting conclusion on state standards of fundamental
fairness and ethical duties of state prosecutors); People v. Vilardi, SSS N.E.2d 91S (N.Y. 1990)
(same); People v. Kern, SS4 N.E.2d 123S, 1241 (N.Y. 1990) (examining text of state constitutional provision, comparing it to text of corresponding federal provision, and touching upon
understanding of the 1938 constitutional convention that drafted state provision). Other cases in
which the court could be considered to have engaged in more considered constitutional analysis
are People v. Scalza, S63 N.E.2d 70S (N.Y. 1990) (performing perfunctory constitutional analysis of provision establishing county courts); City of New York v. State, S62 N.E.2d 118 (N.Y.
1990) (construing home rule provision); People v. Bing, SSS N.E.2d 1011 (N.Y. 1990) (construing right to counsel provision); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State, SSO N.E.2d 919, 923-24
(N.Y. 1990) (construing state court jurisdictional provisions).
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text and what it calls the voters' intent169 rather than more "constitutional" factors such as the structure and political theory of, and values
expressed in, the document. The court's approach is consistent with
and may even be required by the theory of the state constitution,
which places restrictions on the types of measures that can be added to
the constitution by initiative. 170 The California Supreme Court is thus
sometimes put in the strange position of striking down parts of the
state constitution as unconstitutional. 171 This phenomenon suggests
that the state constitution may be viewed as creating two classes of
constitutional provisions, some of which are more "constitutional"
than others. But whatever the basis of the court's statutory approach
to initiative-generated constitutional provisions, the approach limits
the types of elements that are likely to enter into the state constitu1 tional discourse.
4. New Hampshire
I have saved New Hampshire for last because its state constitutional jurisprudence in several respects departs dramatically from that
of the states surveyed above, in ways that make the state a New Federalist's dream. At the same time, though, the court's decisions show
that even a court that actively pursues New Federalism's ideals may be
unable to escape the imposing shadow of federal constitutional law.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court is a court trying mightily to
seize independent control of state constitutional law. First, unlike any
of the other courts we have examined, it has consciously developed a
habit of making Michigan v. Long statements in its opinions dealing
with the state constitution. Thus, the court routinely states specifically that its rulings are made under "our own interpretation of the
New Hampshire Constitution,"1 72 or "as a matter of State law."1 73
Where the court examines federal constitutional rulings in the course
of its state constitutional analysis, it is often at pains to point out that
it looks to federal law "not as binding precedent but only for guidance." 174 These pronouncements seem more than adequate to insulate the state rulings from federal review.
Second, the court has begun to develop conventions governing the
169. E.g., Davis v. City of Berkeley, 794 P.2d 897 (Cal. 1990).
170. See Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077 (Cal. 1990).
171. See Raven, 801 P.2d at 1089.
172. State v. Gallant, 574 A.2d 385, 391 (N.H. 1990).
173. State v. Thompson, 571 A.2d 266, 268 (N.H. 1990).
174. State v. Bosquet, 578 A.2d 853, 855 (N.H. 1990); accord State v. Williams, 581 A.2d 78,
80 (N.H. 1990); State v. Gallant, 574 A.2d 385, 391 (N.H. 1990).
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circumstances under which it will construe the state constitution.
Most prominently, the court has explicitly stated its intention to adopt
a primacy approach to state constitutional claims under which it will
adjudicate state constitutional issues before turning to federal ones. 175
In addition, the court has held that as a general rule it will not consider state constitutional claims unless they were properly raised in the
court below,176
Finally, the court has proceeded to rest a comparatively large proportion of its constitutional rulings on state grounds. In 1990, the
court decided state constitutional issues in 34 (24%) of the 139 full
opinions it issued. In 12 of these cases, the court resolved the case on
state constitutional grounds without ever considering how it might
come out under the federal Constitution.1 77 In 8 cases, the court
looked to federal law for guidance but ultimately grounded its opinion
firmly in the state constitution.178 In 4 cases, the court considered
parallel claims under the state and federal constitutions where the relevant standards were the same and would have yielded the same outcome, yet deliberately refrained from performing a federal
constitutional analysis and instead rested the case exclusively on state
constitutfonal grounds. 179 And in one additional case, the court held
that the state constitution provided greater protection than the comparable federal provision. 180 Thus, nearly three quarters of the court's
state constitutional decisions were based on the state constitution independent of federal law.
175. See State v. Ball, 471 A.2d 347, 351 (N.H. 1983).
176. See State v. Dellorfano, 517 A.2d 1163, 1166 (N.H. 1986).
177. State v. Elliott, 585 A.2d 304 (N.H. 1990) (grand jury indictment); Opinion of the Justices, 584 A.2d 1342 (N.H. 1990) (taxation); Lussier v. New England Power Co., 584 A.2d 179
(N.H. 1990) (right to jury trial); State v. Gooden, 582 A.2d 607 (N.H. 1990) (double jeopardy);
In re Estate ofMcQuesten, 578 A.2d 335 (N.H. 1990) (takings and due process); State v. Eason,
577 A.2d 1203 (N.H. 1990) (rights to produce evidence and to confront); Appeal of Maddox, 575
A.2d 1 (N.H. 1990) (impartial administrative decisionmaker); State v. Monsalve, 574 A.2d 1384
(N.H. 1990) (due process); New Hampshire Mun. Trust Workers' Compensation Fund v. Flynn,
573 A.2d 439 (N.H. 1990) (local government funding); Kiluk v. Potter, 572 A.2d 1157 (N.H.
1990) (state court jurisdiction); State v. Lachapelle, 572 A.2d 584 (N.H. 1990) (notice of criminal
charges); State v. Smith, 571 A.2d 279 (N.H. 1990) (right to bear arms, procedural due process).
178. State v. Williams, 581 A.2d 78 (N.H. 1990) (right to jury trial); State v. Pellicci, 580
A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990) (searches); State v. Bousquet, 578 A.2d 853 (N.H. 1990) (right to jury
trial); In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990) (equal protection); Dover v.
Imperial Casualty & lndem. Co., 575 A.2d 1280 (N.H. 1990) (equal protection); State v. Gallant,
574 A.2d 385 (N.H. 1990) (searches); State v. Field, 571 A.2d 1276 (N.H. 1990) (exclusionary
rule); State v. Thompson, 571 A.2d 266 (N.H. 1990) ("knock-and-announce" rule).
179. State v. Bousquet, 578 A.2d 853 (N.H. 1990) (right to jury trial); In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325 (N.H. 1990) (equal protection); State v. Green, 575 A.2d 1308, 1315
(N.H. 1990) (searches); State v. Settle, 570 A.2d 895, 897 (N.H. 1990) (sufficiency of indictment),
180. State v. Pellicci, 580 A.2d 710 (N.H. 1990) (holding canine sniff a search under state
constitution).
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Yet even in this New Federalism paradise, all is not entirely well.
For example, despite its attempts to distinguish clearly between state
and federal constitutional claims, the New Hampshire Supreme Court
has sometimes fallen prey to the same kinds of obscurities we have
seen in the decisions of other state high courts. Thus, in 4 cases the
court failed to specify whether the· constitutional claim under consideration was a state or federal claim, 181 and in 8 cases both federal and
state constitutional claims were raised but the basis of the court's ruling was unclear.18 2
A much more fundamental problem with the court's state constitutional jurisprudence, however, is that its independence is ultimately
illusory. The court has held explicitly that the state and federal constitutions have essentially the same meaning in a variety of circumstances involving issues such as probable cause, interrogations, due
process, and ineffective assistance of counsel. 183 Moreover, in many
instances where the court has expressly asserted decisional independence under state law, the language and structure of its analyses of the
state constitution are quite clearly borrowed from federal constitutional law.184 For example, the state constitution's equal protection
analysis and terminology is precisely the same as the federal, 185 even if
the state and federal courts might not always agree on the applications
of the relevant tests. Together, these types of cases account for nearly
half of the court's state constitutional caseload.
Most importantly, notwithstanding whatever legal independence
the court may have achieved from federal constitutional law, it has
failed to achieve any kind of independence in its constitutional discourse. For all its talk of independence, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court rarely decides a case without keeping one eye on the comparable
decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court. In addition, the New Hampshire
court's opinions are largely devoid of any kind of language that could
181. State v. Zurita, 584 A.2d 758 (N.H. 1990) (confessions); State v. Plante, 577 A.2d 95
(N.H. 1990) (confessions); State v. Green, 575 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1990) (challenge to stop); Kakris
v. Montbleau, 575 A.2d 1293 (N.H. 1990) (due process).
182. State v. Pond, 584 A.2d 770 (N.H. 1990) (double jeopardy); Bussiere v. Cunningham,
571 A.2d 908 (N.H. 1990) (due process liberty); Humphrey v. Cunningham, 584 A.2d 763 (N.H.
1990) (ineffective assistance of counsel); State v. Fennell, 578 A.2d 329 (N.H. 1990) (ineffective
assistance of counsel); State v. Cox, 575 A.2d 1320 (N.H. 1990) (right to present exculpatory
evidence); State v. Green, 575 A.2d 1308 (N.H. 1990) (interrogation); State v. Tucker, 575 A.2d
810 (N.H. 1990) (suppression); State v. Davis, 575 A.2d 4 (N.H. 1990) (probable cause). In all
but the first two of these cases, the court held that the applicable analysis was the same under
either constitution, but failed to specify whether the basis of its holding was the state or federal
constitution, or both. In none of the cases did the court make a Long statement.
183. See the last six cases cited supra note 182.
184. See supra note 178.
185. E.g., In re Certain Scholarship Funds, 575 A.2d 1325, 1326-27 (N.H. 1990).
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furnish the basis for a discourse of distinctiveness - a way of explaining differences between the state and federal constitutions. The current New Hampshire Constitution has been in effect since 1784, and it
is hardly implausible that small, relatively isolated New Hampshire
could have developed over the past two centuries some kinds of cultural and political differences from the rest of the nation that would
show up in its constitutional discourse and jurisprudence. Yet one
searches the state court's decisions in vain for any indication of such
differences; there is no discussion of the state's founding history, no
mention of its constitution's framers, and no suggestion that the fundamental values or character of the people of the state differ in any
way from those of the people of the nation.
C.

Conclusions

The overwhelming impression left by an examination of state constitutional decisions is that state courts by and large have little interest
in creating the kind of state constitutional discourse necessary to build
an independent body of state constitutional law. With a handful of
exceptions, the decisions fail to address state constitutional issues
squarely and independently from federal constitutional jurisprudence,
and show no sign of any discourse of distinctness that would allow
participants in the legal system to craft intelligible arguments about
the nature of any differences between the state and federal
constitutions.
By engaging in extensive lockstep analysis, many courts have also
created an atmosphere in which it is unnecessary to distinguish between the state and federal constitutions because they are generally
held to have the same meaning. This reduces state constitutional law
to a redundancy and greatly discourages its use and development. In
the few cases in which courts hold the state and federal constitutions
to be distinct, they often seem to have done so in a way that is so
idiosyncratically result-oriented as to provide little basis for further
intelligible debate about the nature of the differences between the two
documents that account for the court's departures from federal norms.
Certainly, litigants can hardly be confident about replicating the results of such cases in factually distinct circumstances.
Furthermore, the lesson of Michigan v. Long seems not to have
penetrated the jurisprudence of any state other than New Hampshire.
By failing to specify when holdings rest on state constitutional
grounds and by borrowing extensively from federal case law when
construing their state constitutions, state courts not only confuse participants in the state legal system but also leave themselves highly vul-
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nerable to Supreme Court review of decisions that may rest on
adequate and independent state grounds.
When he was still on the Oregon Supreme Court, Hans Linde complained that "[a] generation of lawyers ... seems literally speechless"
when faced with questions of state constitutional law. 186 In view of
the actual condition of state constitutional law, however, such silence
seems understandable enough when lawyers lack a language in which
to speak, or at best have a language that is too impoverished to allow
them to say anything worthwhile.181
IV.

THE STANDARD EXPLANATIONS

We have seen that state constitutional discourse is for the most
part far from the vigorously independent discourse New Federalism
hoped for; it is impoverished by comparison to federal constitutional
discourse, and it generally fails to provide a language that participants
in the legal system can use effectively to debate the meaning of the
state constitution. State courts often seem downright reluctant to construe their state constitutions at all, and when they do so their opinions are often vague, perfunctory, or almost entirely dependent on
analytic strategies and terminology borrowed from federal constitutional discourse.
Why should this be the case? Why, after more than two centuries
of state constitutionalism, has state constitutional law so spectacularly
failed to flourish? Advocates of New Federalism have come up with
several standard and widely accepted explanations for this phenomenon. In this section, I review these explanations, and argue that they
fail to account for the poverty of state constitutional discourse.
A.

The Fourteenth Amendment

By far the most widely accepted explanation for the poverty of
contemporary state constitutional law holds that it was marginalized
by the Fourteenth Amendment incorporation doctrine. Until the
early part of this century, the U.S. Supreme Court adhered to the view
that the federal Bill of Rights constrained only the federal government; any similar restrictions on state government, if they existed,
were contained in state constitutions. 188 Starting in the 1930s, however, and continuing into the 1960s, the Supreme Court began to inter186. Linde, supra note 30, at 391.
187. For a different view of the constitutional jurisprudence of the New York Court of Appeals, see Vincent M. Bonaventre, State Constitutionalism in New York: A Non-Reactive Tradition, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CON5f. L. 31 (1989).
188. Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833).
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pret the Fourteenth Amendment as incorporating many of the
standards contained in the Bill of Rights as limitations on state
power. 189
Proponents of what I shall call the "Fourteenth Amendment thesis" argue that the process of incorporation "federalized" the business
of interpreting constitutional rights. 190 By making states enforce federal constitutional standards, 191 incorporation "obscured the functional independence" of state courts, 192 and required state courts to
look to federal law in order to resolve a wide variety of constitutional
issues. As a result, the argument goes, state courts have simply gotten
into the habit of looking to federal constitutional law for the answer to
constitutional questions, whether state or federal.193
This explanation is wholly inadequate; indeed, it is not an explanation of state court behavior at all, but rather a description of such
behavior. Under our system of government, states are independent
sovereigns and state supreme courts are the final arbiters of constitutional self-government on the state level. In the early days of the republic, state courts often jealously guarded against any perceived
federal encroachments on state sovereignty and independence. In
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 194 for example, the Virginia courts rejected
the authority of the Supreme Court to review state court decisions on
federal law; the Supreme Court thus had to struggle with state courts
over what now seem some of the least controversial aspects of constitutional federalism.
While we no longer expect state courts to resist rulings that the
Supreme Court is entitled to make and enforce, we might well expect
state courts to continue to protect state sovereignty and independence
where it is possible to do so. Had state courts in the middle decades of
this century been animated by such a spirit, there was certainly nothing stopping them from staving off the federal dominance in constitutional rights brought about by the Supreme Court's incorporation
decisions. For example, state courts could have utilized their state
189. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 772-74 (2d ed.
1988).
190. E.g., Kaye, supra note 5, at 404-05; Linde, supra note 30, at 382-83; Gary L. McDowell,

Foreword: Rediscovering Federalism? State Constitutional Law and the Restoration of State Sovereignty, 21 RUTGERS L.J. 797, 802-07 (1990).
191. Brennan, State Constitutions, supra note 1, at 495.
192. Developments in the Law, supra note 43, at 1328.
193. See Howard, supra note 25, at 878 ("During the activist Warren years, it was easy for
state courts ... to fall into the drowsy habit of looking no further than federal constitutional
law."); accord Project Report, supra note 25, at 274.
194. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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constitutions before the Supreme Court began its string of incorporation decisions, thereby preventing the Court from gaining the impression that states would not protect the fundamental rights of U.S.
citizens unless forced to do so by the imposition of federal constitutional standards. 19 5 Or, upon perceiving a threat to state sovereignty,
state courts could have seized the initiative in elaborating constitutional rights by giving generous interpretations to their state constitutions, something they did not even begin to do until recently, when it
was probably too late. The real question is thus not whether incorporation changed the constitutional landscape, but why state courts did
nothing to influence the final result. t96
Furthermore, even if the Fourteenth Amendment thesis could explain the withering of state constitutional jurisprudence in the area of
individual rights, it has no power to explain the current extent to
which federal constitutional discourse dominates state constitutional
law. It is useful here to distinguish between two types of state constitutional provisions. Dependent provisions are provisions of the state
constitution that have federal analogues capable of controlling the outcome of cases in which both provisions apply. For example, a state
search and seizure provision is dependent because it has a federal analogue - the Fourth Amendment - capable of controlling the outcome of the case, depending on the interpretation the federal courts
have given it. An independent state constitutional provision is one
that cannot be displaced, regardless of whether an analogous federal
constitutional provision exists. For example, a state constitutional
provision governing executive power is independent because the state
court's construction of that provision will define the extent of the governor's power regardless of how the Supreme Court interprets the
powers of the President under the federal Constitution.
The Fourteenth Amendment thesis could at best explain why federal constitutional discourse has come to dominate the state constitu195. State courts arguably had such poor records of protecting the fundamental rights of
their citizens, see supra note 29, that there was nothing for the Fourteenth Amendment to
marginalize.
196. A variation of the Fourteenth Amendment thesis holds that state courts failed to develop independent state constitutional law because they were literally "too busy" keeping up with
rapidly changing federal constitutional law to pay much attention to their own constitutions. See
DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 4; A.E. Dick Howard, A
Frequent Recurrence to First Principles, Introduction to id., at xi, xv. It is surprising that such an
argument could be seriously advanced. Nobody has claimed that state courts failed to continue
developing state common law during this period because the constitutional decisions of the
Supreme Court kept them too busy. Nor is there any evidence that lower federal courts had the
slightest difficulty "keeping up" with the Supreme Court's constitutional rulings. Indeed, the
Supreme Court incorporation cases could just as easily be viewed as saving time for state courts
by providing vivid demonstrations of the proper way to interpret a constitution.
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tional discourse of dependent provisions of state constitutions. If the
outcome of a state constitutional case dealing with free speech or involuntary confessions turns in the final analysis on whether any standard set by the state constitution satisfies the demands of the
controlling federal constitutional provision, 197 state courts might develop a tendency to use the terms of the federal discourse even when
discussing the state constitutional issue. In reality, however, state
courts have adopted the federal analysis and terms of debate not
merely when construing dependent provisions governed by Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation, but also for many independent state constitutional provisions that federal law - as incorporated in the Fourteenth Amendment - is powerless to affect.
Consider, for example, the political question doctrine. The doctrine, a judicial gloss on the jurisdictional provisions of Article III of
the federal Constitution, holds that federal courts may not hear certain
types of cases for which the exercise of judicial power is deemed inappropriate.198 Typically, the doctrine is invoked in instances where the
Supreme Court would conceive itself to be meddling in the legitimate
affairs of other branches of government; for example, the doctrine applies to cases in which the court lacks expertise or which involve the
exercise of a power constitutionally committed to the executive or legislative branches. 199 Several state supreme courts have held that state
court jurisdiction is limited by a state version of the federal political
question doctrine, and some courts have more or less expressly incorporated the leading federal cases into the state's political question
jurisprudence.200
Now it is certainly possible for a state constitution to contain a
political question doctrine, and it is even possible for the state doctrine
to be so similar to the federal version that precisely the same analysis
could be used for both - possible, but highly unlikely. Unlike the
federal courts, which are courts of limited jurisdiction, state courts

197. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; amend. 14.
198. The leading case is still Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See also Goldwater v.
Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 998-1000 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring).
199. Baker, 369 U.S. at 217.
200. See Pellegrino v. O'Neill, 480 A.2d 476, 481-83 (Conn. 1984); State ex rel. Oberly v.
Troise, 526 A.2d 898, 904-05 (Del. 1987); Trustees of Hawaiian Affairs v. Yamasaki, 737 P.2d
446, 455-56 (Haw. 1987); Kluk v. Lang, 531 N.E.2d 790, 797 (Ill. 1988); Gilbert v. Gladden, 432
A.2d 1351, 1354 (N.J. 1981); State ex rel. Meshel v. Keip, 423 N.E.2d 60, 64 (Ohio 1981); People
v. Ohrenstein, 549 N.Y.S.2d 962, 971 (App.Div. 1989), affd. on other grounds, 565 N.E.2d 493
(N.Y. 1990) (adopting Baker analysis). Other cases are collected in Nat Stern, The Political
Question Doctrine in State Courts, 35 S.C. L. REv. 405 (1984).

February 1992]

State Constitutionalism

809

may be courts of general jurisdiction.201 In the absence of limiting
constitutional language, the ordinary presumption would be that state
courts are constitutionally empowered to hear cases, not that they
share a limitation in common with federal courts.202 Further, virtually all state courts have significant common law powers that federal
courts lack. The power to elaborate the common law is a power to
make law, and to do so in what are nowadays extremely complex areas
such as tort liability and contractual relations. The political question
doctrine, however, is based on the incompetence of federal courts to
invade the legislative sphere, or to deal with complex aspects of social
policy - actions that state courts take routinely when exercising their
common law powers. Thus, it is not at all clear that state courts
should be subject to a political question limitation, and if they are, it
seems implausible that the state limitation would be nearly so restrictive as the federal one.203
Similarly, several state supreme courts have adopted the federal
interpretation of the Speech or Debate Clause204 and the federal separation of powers bar on the legislative veto, 205 both aspects of state
constitutional law that might be expected to differ, perhaps significantly, from their federal counterparts.206 The Fourteenth Amend201. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 401-02 (1857); Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S.
1, 15 (1976).
.
202. This phenomenon can be seen clearly in state law dealing with standing. Many states
have far more relaxed rules of standing than federal courts due to the unrestricted jurisdiction of
state courts. See generally Jennifer Friesen, Recovering Damages for State Bills ofRights Claims,
63 TExAs L. REV. 1269, 1298-303 (1985). Others permit their courts to issue advisory opinions,
something federal courts are forbidden to do because of the lack of a case or controversy. U.S.
CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. l; see Charles M. Carberry, Co=ent, The State Advisory Opinion in
Perspective, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81 (1975).
203. Cf. Dennis NettikSi=ons, Towards a Theory ofState Constitutional Jurisprudence, 46
MONT. L. REV. 261, 285 (1985).
204. U.S. CoNST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
205. See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
206. For example, a state version of the Speech or Debate Clause might differ from the federal version because state legislatures, unlike Congress, have the direct power to pass legislation
insulating themselves from liability under state law for statements made or things done in the
course of their legislative duties. In addition, state courts have the power to create exceptions to
common law doctrines, such as libel, for such public policy reasons as immunizing legislators in
appropriate situations. These factors might suggest an extremely narrow reading for a state
Speech or Debate Clause on the theory that the state legislature or courts can always broaden the
scope of legislative i=unity.
Similarly, there is no good reason to assume that the legislative veto would be unconstitutional under a state constitution. The Supreme Court invalidated the use of legislative vetoes on
separation of power grounds, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), but the structure of separation of powers under state constitutions often differs dramatically from the federal division of
power. For example, governors often have line-item veto powers; courts often have lawmaking
and rulemaking powers; and lower-ranking executive branch officials, such as attorneys general
and comptrollers, are often independently elected. Given these differences, it does not necessarily follow that the separation of powers means the same thing under a state constitution as under
the U.S. Constitution.
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ment thesis fails to explain the willingness of state courts to adopt
federal doctrine in these areas in which state constitutional law operates completely independently of federal power.
B. Lawyers and Law Schools

The second most popular explanation for the languishing of state
constitutional law offered by New Federalism advocates is that lawyers who appear in state court fail to raise independent state constitutional arguments. 207 Some have added that the fault really lies with
the law schools, which fail to teach state constitutional law. 208 This
finger-pointing, which seems especially popular with state judges,2°9 is
occasionally accompanied by a disapproving suggestion of lawyer laziness: "[T]o make an independent argument under the state [constitution]," former Justice Hans Linde has admonished, "takes homework
- in texts, in history, in alternative approaches to analysis."210
The suggestion that lawyers are somehow responsible for the failure of state courts to develop state constitutional jurisprudence is
frankly absurd. Lawyers will make the arguments they need to make
to win cases. If lawyers are not making state constitutional arguments, it is because doing so does not help them win. 211 As the survey
of state constitutional cases in the previous section shows, state courts
often discourage the making of such arguments by their own adjudicatory practices.
As for law schools, it is undoubtedly always popular to blame
them for ills of the legal system, and sometimes such blame may be
justified - but not in this case. It is true that few law schools offer
courses in the constitutional law of particular states; but it is equally
true that few law schools offer courses in the contract, tort, or property law of particular states. Somehow law school graduates are able
to work effectively within the state common law systems after a legal
education in general principles of those areas of law, and constitutional law is no different. The real problem is not the education in
207. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1161-63; Collins, supra note 25, at 19 n.69; James C.
Kirby, Jr., Expansive Judicial Review ofEconomic Regulation Under State Constitutions, in DEVELOPMENTS IN STATE CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW, supra note 7, at 94, 94-95; Linde, supra note 30,
at 391-92; Pollock, supra note 2, at 721-22; Collins, supra note 29, at 9 & n.75.
208. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1163; Abrahamson, supra note 29, at 964; Douglas, supra
note 29, at 1147; Kaye, supra note 5, at 405; Linde, supra note 30, at 392; Linde, supra note 5, at
174-75; Collins, supra note 29, at 5-6.
209. See the articles by Judge Judith Kaye, supra note 5, former Justice Hans Linde, supra
notes 5 and 30, Justice Shirley Abrahamson, supra notes 5 and 29, and Justice Charles G. Douglas, III, supra note 29.
210. Linde, supra note 30, at 392.
211. Abrahamson, supra note 5, at 1162-63.
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state constitutional law offered by law schools, but the one offered by
state courts.
C. Lack of Historical Data
A third explanation sometimes given for the impoverishment of
state constitutional law is the dea,:th of historical materials related to
the founding of the state constitution.212 The lack of such materials
can hinder the search for constitutional meaning by making it extremely difficult to reconstruct the intent of the framers, thereby hindering the development of an independent state constitutional
discourse and making the turn to federal analogues more appealing.
This is a cogent explanation, but, as it turns out, one available to very
few states.
Among the fifty states, only Massachusetts, Vermont, and New
Hampshire now operate under constitutions adopted in the eighteenth
century. 213 The present constitutions of eighteen states were adopted
after 1900, and fifteen states operate under constitutions that were
adopted between 1875 and 1899.214 The recency of these documents
greatly enhances the possibility of meaningful historical research.
Moreover, even the older constitutions have been amended so often
that the adoption of many significant constitutional provisions is likely
to be well recorded. 215 And even where recordkeeping at constitutional conventions was skimpy, other sources such as newspaper accounts and the personal correspondence of delegates can help fill in
the historical gaps. Work by Justice Robert F. Utter of the Washington Supreme Court illustrates the type of creative historical research
that can be done in this area.216
Finally, detailed historical records are simply not necessary to create a rich constitutional discourse. Chief Justice John Marshall lacked
many of the historical sources that are readily available to and routinely consulted by judges and lawyers today, 217 yet he managed none212. See, e.g., Teachout, supra note 28.
213. Sturm, supra note 69, at 75-76.
214. Id. at 74-76.
215. Grodin, supra note 54, at 393-95 (discussing documentation of 1849 California constitutional convention); Vito J. Titone, State Constitutional Interpretation: The Search for an Anchor
in a Rough Sea, 61 ST. JOHN'S L. R:Ev. 431, 459-63 (1987).
216. See Utter, supra note 35, at 253-59; Robert F. Utter, Church and State on the Frontier:
The History of the Establishment Clauses in the Washington State Constitution, 15 HASTINGS
CoNST. L.Q. 451 (1988).
217. For example, James Madison's notes of the constitutional convention were not published until 1840, after his death. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1787 viii-ix (Adrienne Koch ed., 1966).
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theless almost single-handedly to found the rich and intricate federal
constitutional discourse that we have inherited.
V.

THE FAILURE OF STATE CONSTITUTIONALISM

If none of the reasons examined above explains the poverty of
modern state constitutional discourse, what can explain it? In this
Part, I argue that the cause of the problem is a failure that goes much
deeper than the actions of the Supreme Court, the state bar, or the law
schools. All these groups, as well as state courts themselves, are responding to the same underlying phenomenon: the failure of state
constitutionalism itself to provide a workable model for the contemporary practice of constitutional law and discourse on the state level. In
particular, state courts do not talk about state constitutions in the way
New Federalism advocates because to do so would be to talk in a way
that, under present conditions, simply makes no sense.

A. State Constitutionalism
State constitutionalism lies at the intersection of two powerful
American political doctrines: federalism and constitutionalism. Federalism provides a theory of statehood, constitutionalism a theory of
the nature of constitutions. Together, these two sets of principles provide a guiding, foundational approach to the interpretation of state
constitutions, an approach that has decisively shaped the thinking of
New Federalism advocates, as well as state courts themselves.
1. Federalism
The fundamental organizing principle that distinguishes states
from other political entities in our system of government is the familiar notion of federalism. According to federalist doctrine, the United
States is a unique kind of republic composed of individual state governments and a single, overarching national government. Although
the states are "constituent parts" of the United States,21 s they are not
in any essential way subordinate to the national government. Rather,
the state and national governments together comprise a system of dual
sovereignty219 in which each government is deemed to be an independent sovereign, but in distinct spheres of action. 220 Madison, for example, conceived that the national government would have primary
218. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 9 (Alexander Hamilton), at 76.
219. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN 48-76 (1987).
220. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 39 (James Madison), at 244; see DAVID F. EPSTEIN, THE PoLmCAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 51-52 (1984).
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responsibility for "external objects, as war, peace, negotiation and foreign commerce"; the states, on the other hand, would exercise sovereignty principally over "the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people." 221
At the time of the framing of the Constitution, there was some
disagreement over the idea of dividing governmental sovereignty in
this way; some thought that sovereignty was by its nature indivisible,
and that any attempt to divide it must fail. The Framers solved this
theoretical difficulty by locating a single, indivisible sovereignty in the
people themselves. As ultimate sovereign, the people could divide up
the powers of government and distribute them as they saw fit. 222
Thus, according to Madison, "The federal and State governments are
in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, constituted with
different powers and designed for different purposes." 223
Under this plan, the people have organized themselves for purposes of self-government in the following way. First, all the people of
the United States together constitute a society that has created and is
jointly subject to the rule of the national government within its designated scope. Second, the people have divided themselves into separate, smaller societies - the states - and are subject in this second
capacity to the rule of the government of the state in which they reside.224 Every citizen thus belongs to two distinct political societies,
each constituted for a different purpose and having different powers
and characteristics.
In this way, federalism provides a clear political definition of statehood. 225 According to federalist doctrine, a state is a self-governing
political society of individuals who comprise a subset of all American
citizens. The state government is created by the people of the state
and given such powers as the people deem appropriate, other than
those specifically delegated to the United States, another self-governing society to which the people of the state also belong. The state
government thus possesses whatever independent sovereign power the
221. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 45, at 292-93; see also id. No. 39 (James
Madison), at 245 (states would exercise "a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects" not put within power of national government).
222. See BERGER, supra note 219, at 51-52 (remarks of James Wilson).
223. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 46, at 294.
224. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 39 (James Madison), at 245.
225. Federalism's political premises rest on other philosophic considerations that are not
directly relevant here, such as Enlightenment era epistemology and related theories of natural
law. For a survey of these ideas, see MORTON WHITE, PHILOSOPHY, THE FEDERALIST, AND
THE CONSTITUTION (1987). For a more complete discussion of the contours of the doctrine of
popular sovereignty, see James A. Gardner, Consent, Legitimacy and Elections: Implementing
Popular Sovereignty Under the Lockean Constitution, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 189, 200-13 (1990).
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people of the state choose to give it, within the potential realm of activity allowed it by the national political society.
2.

Constitutionalism

The other half of the state constitutionalism equation is the notion
of constitutionalism - the idea that a constitution is a unique document of political foundation. Like federalism, constitutionalism is
close to the heart of American political theory and rests on many of
the same political premises.
The pithiest, although by no means the first, expression of the essence of American constitutionalism is Chief Justice John Marshall's
remark in McCulloch v. Maryland: 226 "[W]e must never forget," he
wrote, "that it is a constitution we are expounding. " 227 This cryptic
phrase aptly captures the judicial view, embraced consistently ever
since, that a constitution is different from other types of documents
that courts may be called upon to interpret and must be approached at
all times with those differences in mind.
The first and foremost difference between a constitution and other
sources of law is that a constitution is considered to be a direct act of
the sovereign people themselves. 228 Because the people are the sovereigns in our system and the government merely the people's agents, a
constitution speaks with a political authority that no law or other governmental action can ever attain. The constitution is thus a form of
higher law that always binds the government, and is unchangeable except by further action of the people themselves. 229 That a constitution
is written only further evidences the people's intent that it be
permanent.
But it is not only the authority of a constitution that distinguishes
it from other forms of law; it differs in subject matter as well. A constitution is a charter of self-government; it is the means by which the
people communicate to their agents the scope of authority that may be
wielded in the people's behalf.230 As a result, according once again to
Chief Justice Marshall, the nature of a constitution "requires, that
only its great outlines should be marked, [and] its important objects
226. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
227. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
228. See, e.g., U.S. CoNST. pmbl. ("We the People ..• "); Gardner, supra note 225, at 200·
13.
229. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, DEATH PENALTIES 66 (1982); Henry Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353, 376 & n. 135, 392 (1981); Earl Maltz, Foreword: The
Appeal of Originalism, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 773, 801-02.
230. Cf THE FEDERALIST, supra note 37, No. 10 (James Madison), at 82; No. 2 (John Jay),
at 37; No. 46, at 294; No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), at 467.
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designated." 231 To use the current language of the Supreme Court,
the Constitution embodies the "fundamental values" of the American
people.232
Although these principles of constitutionalism are most often associated with the U.S. Constitution, they are generally thought to apply
with equal force to state constitutions. The only difference is that the
federal Constitution is thought to express the fundamental values and
choices of the national polity, and state constitutions are thought to
express the fundamental values of the various state polities that have
adopted them. Thus, many state supreme courts use the language of
"fundamental values" when construing their state constitutions;233 as
Judge Judith Kaye of the New York Court of Appeals has written, the
state constitution is "that set of values to which we have bound ourselves, the values that transcend even our currently made choices."234
3.

Constitutionalism and Constitutional Discourse

In addition to their political dimensions, constitutionalism and federalism also suggest a way of thinking about the community-defining
aspects of constitutional discourse. Because a constitution is a document that by definition embodies the most fundamental decisions of a
polity concerning the ways in which its members want to live their
lives, a constitution necessarily reveals a wealth of information about
the character of those who, politically speaking, are its authors. 235 To
place instructions in a constitution is to say that certain things shall or
shall not be done, and to constrain the actions of the government in
this way is to say that we are a people who will not tolerate (or who
require) certain types of behavior toward one another. The content of
a constitution can thus reflect some of the most essential and intimate
231. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
232. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S.
747, 789 (1986) (White, J., dissenting) ("The Constitution ..• is a document announcing fundamental principles in value-laden terms"); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring) (Constitution embodies "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far
worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free"); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 471 (1984) (Stevens, J.) (Eighth Amendment reflects "a fundamental value that the
Framers wished to secure against legislative majorities").
233. See, e.g., Hatchard v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 532 A.2d 346, 350 (Pa. 1987)
(stating that state constitution establishes reputation as "fundamental right[]"); Bernzen v. City
of Boulder, 525 P.2d 416, 419 (Col. 1974) (stating that state constitution designates recall, initiative, and referendum as "fundamental rights ••. which the people have reserved unto themselves"); Pacheco v. School Dist. No. 11, 516 P.2d 629, 633 (Col. 1973) (Kelley, J., dissenting)
(stating that state constitution guarantees "fundamental values" against erosion by legislature).
234. Kaye, supra note 5, at 421.
235. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; see also Jerry Frug, Argument as Character, 40 STAN. L. REV. 869 (1988).
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aspects of the character of the people who adopted it, a feature that
courts can occasionally exploit in order to assist them in construing
the constitution in difficult cases.2 36
In this view, as noted earlier, constitutional discourse transcends
the bounds of any particular legal dispute or occasion for judicial action; it becomes instead a forum in which the members of a polity
debate their own identity - their character and fundamental values.
Under the influence of a robust constitutional discourse, the contours
of the constitution thus come to define not merely a body of positive
law but the identity and character of the polity itself.
4. Local Variations in Character
State constitutionalism, then, holds that a state constitution is the
creation of the sovereign people of the state and reflects the fundamental values, and indirectly the character, of that people. An important
corollary of this proposition is that the fundamental values and character of the people of the various states actually differ, both from state
to state and as between the state and national polities. One can confirm this corollary by simple observation: no two state constitutions
are identical, and no state constitution is identical to the federal Constitution. These variations, because they occur in constitutions, are by
definition of constitutional dimension; the people who adopted the
constitutions could have made them identical but deliberately chose
different language and provisions. It follows that these differences reflect differences in the fundamental value choices and character of the
people who made the constitutions.
This type of argument appears frequently in New Federalism literature. We are told, for example, that a state constitution must be
viewed as "a declaration of certain values held by the citizens of that
state" and that the constitution "reflects the geography, history, culture and uniqueness" of the state. 237 Courts, it is said, have a responsi236. Certainly the most notable example of this technique is Ravin v. State, 537 P.2d 494
(Alaska 1975). There, the Alaska Supreme Court held that the right to privacy guaranteed by
the state constitution required the invalidation of a law criminalizing the possession of small
amounts of marijuana in the home. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied explicitly on
what it viewed as the unique character of Alaskans:
The privacy amendment to the Alaska Constitution was intended to give recognition and
protection to the home. Such a reading is consonant with the character of life in Alaska.
Our territory and now state has traditionally been the home of people who prize their indi·
viduality and who have chosen to settle or to continue living here in order to achieve a
measure of control over their own lifestyles which is now virtually unattainable in many of
our sister states.
537 P.2d at 503-04. The result in Ravin has since been overturned by passage of a ballot mea·
sure. See infra note 283.
237. Judith S. Kaye, A Midpoint Perspective on Directions in State Constitutional Law, 1
EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CoNsr. L. 17, 19 (1988); see also Abrahamson, supra note 29, at 965
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bility "to create for each state a jurisprudence uniquely expressive of
that state's own constitutional culture and faithful to its own particular traditions." 238 Professor A.E. Dick Howard has summed up this
view of state constitutionalism succinctly:
[N]o function of a constitution, especially in the American states, is
more important than its use in defining a people's aspirations and fundamental values....
. . . A state constitution is a fit place for the people of a state to record
their moral values, their definition of justice, their hopes for the common
good. A state constitution defines a way of life. 239

If the people of the states have unique cultures, traditions, or values - if they have chosen different ways of life - how might these
differences translate into constitutional terms? Consider the following
comparison:
The founders of a populist frontier state with a tradition of ferocious
individualism, like Washington or Oregon, probably intended to carve
out a larger sphere of rights, a larger arena of activity into which the
government could not intrude, at least with respect to such matters as
bearing arms and avoiding scrutiny, than a more communitarian, homogeneous state like Massachusetts or one with sectarian roots like Maryland. Those latter states, on the other hand, might be assumed to have
cared more deeply about matters of religion. 240

This narrative is a powerful one, for it contemplates potentially different meanings even for constitutions containing identical language.
These variations in meaning would stem from variations in the character of the polities, character differences that cause them to embrace as
fundamental substantially different values - in this case, the untamed
but irresponsible westerner and the domesticated but righteous easterner choose different ways of life.
This type of reasoning seems to hold out the greatest hope for the
type of independent state constitutional discourse New Federalism
aims for, yet it appears virtually nowhere in the actual discourse of
state constitutional law. Why? In the following sections I argue that
participants in the legal system do not talk this way for the simple
(A state's "land, its industry, its people, its history" may be "peculiarities" that will influence
interpretation of the state constitution.).
238. Teachout, supra note 28, at 19; accord NettikSimmons, supra note 203.
239. Howard, supra note 33, at 14; see also Howard, supra note 196, at xxiii; Howard, supra
note 25, at 938-39. Other commentators have taken a similar view. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note
237, at 19; Linde, supra note 30, at 395; Teachout, supra note 28, at 19.
240. David Schuman, Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases: A Report from the Provinces, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN ST. CoNsr. L. 275, 285 (1989); cf. Utter, supra note 35, at 244
(drawing inferences based on "the vast differences in culture, politics, experience, education and
economic status between ..• the Washington framers of 1889 and the Eastern framers of the
United States Bill of Rights in 1789 [sic], and the enormous differences of history and local
conditions that separated the two conventions").
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reason that such talk would make no sense. This is so for three reasons. First, the notion of state constitutions as defining distinctive and
coherent ways of life does not accurately describe actual state constitutions and thus cannot furnish a useful way of talking about them. Second, state constitutionalism itself embraces theoretical inconsistencies
that impair its usefulness as a framework for state constitutional discourse. Most significantly, state constitutionalism is incompatible
with national constitutionalism; indeed, the type of robust state constitutionalism advocated by New Federalism could pose a serious threat
to the nationwide stability and sense of community that national constitutionalism provides.
Finally, whatever currency the notion oflocal variations in character and values might once have had, it is a notion that no longer describes in any realistic way the polities of the present day states.
Regardless of what they may once have been, Americans are now a
people who are so alike from state to state, and whose identity is so
much associated with national values and institutions, that the notion
of significant local variations in character and identity is just too implausible to take seriously as the basis for a distinct constitutional
discourse.
B.

Conundrums of Character

Suppose we take seriously the premises of federalism and constitutionalism and apply them to the interpretation of state constitutions we must never forget, we might say, that it is a state constitution we
are expounding. To undertake this task is to encounter significant
contradictions and implausibilities in the doctrine of state
constitutionalism.
The average state constitution is about four times as long as the
U.S. Constitution;241 the constitutions of Alabama, Oklahoma, and
Texas are more than eight times as long. 242 While every state constitution contains a bill of rights and sets out a basic three-branch governmental structure, the additional length of state constitutions is
attributable primarily to two factors. First, state constitutions typically cover a much broader scope of subject matter than the federal
Constitution. For example, almost every state constitution contains
lengthy and explicit provisions about financial matters - how taxes
are to be assessed, how revenue bills are to be enacted, how revenues
241. Sturm, supra note 69, at 74.
242. Id. at 75-76.
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are to be collected and spent.243 Some state constitutions contain detailed provisions relating to aspects of transportation such as highways, 244 railroads, 245 or levee construction and maintenance.246 Other
constitutions contain provisions dealing with corporations,247
mines, 248 interest rates, 249 lotteries and bingo, 250 and prisons. 251 These
are, of course, concerns entirely absent from the U.S. Constitution that
are handled on the federal level exclusively as legislative matters.
Second, state constitutions differ from the federal Constitution in
the level of detail in which they describe, and therefore the extent to
which they constrain, governmental action with respect to subjects
covered by the constitution. For example, as Judge Kaye of the New
York Court of Appeals is fond of pointing out,252 the New York Constitution contains a provision specifying the width of ski trails in the
Adirondack Park.253 The California Constitution specifies the way in
which taxes are to be assessed on golf courses.254 The Texas Constitution provides for banks' use of "unmanned teller machines." 2 5 5
If a state constitution reflects the character of the people of a state,
what can one say about the character of a people who enshrine these
types of provisions in their constitutions - who evidently hold the
values expressed in these provisions so dear that they see a need to
place them beyond the reach of temporary majorities and transient
passions, and to permit their alteration only by future direct action of
the people themselves? Can one say of New Yorkers, for example,
that they are a people who cherish their liberty to ski? If so, how does
such a provision fit in with the other liberties conqiined in the New
York Constitution, such as freedom of speech? Are New Yorkers a
people who like to talk and schuss? To ski down a mountain and discuss politics over hot chocolate? If we are to take seriously the notion
that the state constitution reveals the character of the people, we may
be forced to the unappetizing conclusion that the people of New York,
243. See, e.g., CAL. CoNST. art. XIII; N.Y. CoNST. arts. 7-8.
244. See MINN. CoNST. art. 14.
245. See, e.g., OKLA. CoNST. art. IX; Mo. CONST. art. 11, §§ 9-11.
246. See MISS. CoNST. art. 11.
247. See, e.g., IDAHO CoNST. art. 11; Mo. CONST. art. 11; TEX. CONST. art. XII.
248. See, e.g., WY. CONST. art. 9; N.M. CoNST. art. 17.
249. See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 15.
250. See, e.g., KAN. CoNST. art. 15, §§ 3, 3a.
251. See, e.g., MISS. CONST. art. 10.
252.
253.
254.
255.

Kaye, supra note 237, at 18-19; Kaye, supra note 5, at 408.
See N.Y. CoNST. art. 14, § 1.
See CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 10.
See TEX. CoNST. art. 16, § 16.
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or California, or Texas are simply a frivolous people who are unable to
distinguish between things that are truly important and things that are
not.
In a similar vein, consider that Louisiana has had eleven constitutions since it became a state, and that Georgia has had nine, South
Carolina seven, and Virginia, Alabama, and Florida six each. 256 The
Alabama Constitution has been amended over five hundred times, 257
the California and South Carolina Constitutions over four hundred
times, and the Texas Constitution more than two hundred times. 258 If
these histories also reveal the character of the people of the states, they
reveal people who are fickle and unreflective - people who do not
know what they want, who change their mind frequently, and who are
apparently incapable of learning from their mistakes.
Conclusions such as these strike powerfully at the premises of constitutionalism. A people who are frivolous, or fickle, or unreflective,
are a people not worthy of respect. And a people whom we cannot
respect are not a people to whom we can comfortably attribute an
overall constitutional plan, a meaningful history of purposeful debate,
or a coherent political theory - the very factors noticeably absent
from state constitutional discourse. Moreover, this suspicion of the
people and of their constitution severely constrains the way in which it
is possible to talk about the meaning of the constitution. To be sure,
we will always have the text of individual provisions, and there may be
some sort of legislative history associated with each such provision.
But we may feel extremely uncomfortable in these circumstances adding political, ethical, historical, or structural considerations to the
state constitutional discourse because we may feel unable to construct
a coherent story about the meaning of the constitution that includes
these elements. Again, these elements are generally missing from state
constitutional discourse, and their absence can make state constitutional interpretation seem like ordinary statutory construction.
An objection might be raised at this point. Perhaps, it might be
said, the seemingly frivolous nature of some state constitutional provisions and the frequency with which state constitutions are amended
merely suggest that we are looking for the wrong kind of constitutional meaning. Of course it is ludicrous to suggest that a provision
governing the width of ski trails reflects a fundamental value of the
people of New York. It is far more likely that such a provision is
256. Sturm, supra note 69, at 75-76.
257. See ALA. CoNST. (Michie 1991).
258. Sturm, supra note 69, at 78-79.
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merely the result of a political compromise, perhaps among environmentalists and development interest groups, and it should be treated
as such. It is accordingly a mistake to invest the provision with any
more portentous meaning.
If such provisions are merely political compromises - and that
certainly seems like a plausible explanation - they pose no less a
threat to our notions of constitutionalism than does the idea that the
people are incompetent. According to the conventions of constitutionalism, a constitution is not supposed to be the outcome of pluralistic
political bargaining on matters of everyday concern; that is the role
played in our system by statutory law. Rather, constitutionalism assumes that a constitution is the consensual act of a united society; it is
viewed as the outcome of a process of deliberation meant to identify
matters of fundamental importance to the people and to place those
matters in a constitution specifically to protect them from the quotidian predations of pluralistic power struggles.259
To the extent that a constitution or a particular provision departs
so far from this model that it cannot plausibly be viewed as anything
other than the result of pluralistic logrolling, constitutional discourse
is correspondingly impoverished. One cannot plausibly claim a meaning rooted in political theory, or justice, or the framers' deliberations
on fundamental principles, for a constitutional provision that can only
be explained as the result of a political deal among interest groups. Of
course, it is not necessarily impossible to create a rich story about a
constitutional provision just because it resulted from compromise.
Our federal constitutional tradition has done just that by elevating
some of the overt compromises appearing in the federal Constitution
to near-mythical status, such as the Great Compromise that created
popular representation in the House and representation by state in the
Senate - a compromise viewed as so historically significant that we
have named and capitalized it.260 But the basis of legislative representation is still very different from the taxation of golf courses or the
width of ski trails, and it somehow seems improbable that a similar
myth could emerge about a constitutional provision such as California's or New York's.
Robert Cover once wrote: "No set oflegal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.
259. See supra notes 228-36 and accompanying text.
260. Another compromise prevented regulation of the slave trade until 1808, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 1. This feature of the Constitution plays a prominent role in the story of the Civil
War and the subsequent Reconstruction Amendments.
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For every constitution there is an epic .... " 261 Yet state constitutions
are hard-pressed to generate epics to give them meaning. When we
tum upon state constitutions the narrative devices we use to create
constitutional meaning on the federal level, we find state constitutions
wanting. The stories to which they lend themselves are not stories of
principle and integrity, but stories of expediency and compromise at
best, foolishness and inconstancy at worst. And the poverty of state
constitutional discourse merely reflects the limited narrative possibilities that state constitutions offer to erstwhile interpreters. 262
But if this description is accurate, it reveals yet another contradiction. We cannot seriously be willing to accept the conclusion that the
people of the states are incapable of competent constitutional self-government. In fact, we know such a proposition to be false because
every state citizen is also a citizen of the United States, and therefore,
politically speaking, an author of the U.S. Constitution. Yet the U.S.
Constitution is not only a vehicle of competent constitutional self-government, but a model emulated throughout the nation and the world.
As noted earlier, it is the focus of an extraordinarily rich constitutional
discourse - one providing the material for a true epic - that allows
U.S. citizens to debate the meaning of the Constitution and, by so doing, to debate their own identity. 263 By taking seriously the premises
of state constitutionalism, we seem driven to the position that the people of the United States are simultaneously both competent and incompetent practitioners of constitutional self-government.
What can explain these contradictions? The next section argues
that the divergence between the pedestrian reality of state constitutions and the grand predictions of state constitutionalism can be explained in part by two factors: the incompatibility of state and federal
constitutionalism, and American society's choice to adopt a national
rather than a state identity.

261. Robert M. Cover, Foreword: Nomos and Na"ative, 91 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983).
262. Even Hans Linde himself, one of the guiding forces behind New Federalism, has recog·
nized this aspect of state constitutional law. State constitutions, he has written, "demystify con·
stitutional law. . . . They have drafters, yes, but no 'Founders'; no Federalist Papers; no
equivalence of constitution and nationhood; no singularity[;] ..• no sanctified judges; certainly
no claim as a 'civil religion' or as the perfect embodiment of justice, when there are forty-nine
others." Linde, supra note 5, at 197 (footnote omitted). Linde goes on to ask why, if a constitu·
tion does not enshrine "strongly held values,'' we ought to respect it. Id. at 198. His answer
simply falls back on convention: "Any student of state constitutions knows that some of their
provisions deserve very little respect, but they are nonetheless the law .•.•" Id.
263. See supra notes 19·24 and accompanying text.
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The Incompatibility of State and Federal Constitutionalism
1.

The Framework of Nationhood

Certainly one of the foundational and indispensable beliefs of
American political and social life is that we are a nation, which is to
say that we constitute collectively a certain community. To have a
sense of community sufficient to sustain such a belief is to have, as
Robert Burt has pointed out, "an acknowledged common identity"
capable of transcending disputes and differences that arise among
us. 264 Under what conditions can such a common identity exist? According to James Boyd White, a community is, on the most basic level,
"a group of people who tell a shared story in a shared language."265
On this view, discourse is a critical element of the communal relationship: The "community talks itself into an historical identity."266
One way discourse accomplishes this task is by revealing and
maintaining the common values of the members of the community. 267
The existence of such values is a necessary condition for the emergence of a community; as Kenneth Karst has put it, American nationhood rests on a shared culture, national in scope, consisting of, at
minimum, "a set of universal norms." 268 Moreover, such a community cannot be forced into existence or declared to exist by fiat; 269 it
can arise "only as a by-product of the shared pursuit of more tangible
goals and activities."210
For Americans, discourse, values, and activities all intersect in the
U.S. Constitution: it is a text, and thus a form of discourse; its subject
matter is the values of society; and it is used in a real way as part of the
activity of self-governance. As a result, the Constitution performs a
highly important function in not only symbolizing American nationhood, but in constituting it as well. 271 It serves as a focal point for
the creation and perpetuation of a plausible narrative identity for the
264. Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455,
456 (1984).
265. WHITE, HERACLES, supra note 14, at 172.
266. Kahn, supra note 20, at 3.
267. Id.
268. KENNETH L. KARsT, BELONGING IN AMERICA 28-31, 31 (1989).
269. See Burt, supra note 264, at 486; cf. Milner S. Ball, Stories of Olfgin and Constitutional
Possibilities, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2280, 2315 (1989) (arguing ideas cannot transform the popular

will).
270. KARST, supra note 268, at 180 (quoting DENNIS H. WRONG, SKEPTICAL SOCIOLOGY 79
(1976)).
271. KARST, supra note 268, at 177; WHITE, HERACLES, supra note 14, at 41; see also KAMMEN, MACHINE, supra note 17, at 68-94; Note, Amendomania, supra note 26, at 281 (noting that
California Constitution is "totally unfit to be a popular ideological rallying point or symbol").
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national community and its individual members. 2 72
But if the Constitution helps create and define a national identity,
it also helps to set limits - both for the community and for its individual members - on what that identity can be. 273 If we as a nation are a
community that holds certain values, then it becomes difficult for
those who consider themselves to be members of the community to
hold different or incompatible values and to act on them. Suppose, for
example, that the Constitution embodies "a fundamental value determination of our [national] society that it is far worse to convict an
innocent man than to let a guilty man go free. " 274 If so, society would
be extremely hard-pressed to tolerate behavior by individuals or subgroups based on the notion that the goal of pursuing the guilty justifies
inadvertently harming the innocent. If we are a people who value justice, one might say, can we also be a people who value expediency?
It is in this sense of constraining identity - what Robert Cover
called the ''jurispathic" function of law275 - that the existence in our
system of state constitutions is in tension with the premises of national
constitutionalism and may even pose a genuine threat to it. Our constitutional language and culture hold the U.S. Constitution to be the
repository of the fundamental values of the national community, a
community to which every citizen belongs. When we apply the same
conventions to state constitutions, we are led of course to the same
conclusion: state constitutions are also the repository of fundamental
values, but the values are those of the peoples of the individual states.
This arrangement is workable, although seemingly redundant, as
long as the state and federal constitutions are congruent. But if they
differ, the conventions of constitutionalism compel the conclusion that
the values embodied in the state constitution are fundamental to the
people of the state but not to the people of the nation, and vice versa.
This, too, would be untroubling were it not for the fact that the members of the state community are also members of the national community. Thus, when a state constitution conflicts with the national
Constitution, we can only conclude that the people of that state consider certain values fundamental for themselves, but not for the rest of
us.
Even on the most basic level, this type of divergence can be unsettling. If a value is good enough to be fundamental to the people of the
272. See Ball, supra note 269, at 2282-87 (discussing the American story of national origin).
273. See Kahn, supra note 20, at 5 ("Individual identity does not exist apart from the discourse that creates and sustains the community.").
274. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
275. Cover, supra note 261, at 41-42.
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state, one might say, why isn't it good enough for everybody? There is
something vaguely selfish and hostile about the people of a state going
off to their own comer and making up rules for their own self-governance that they think superior to the ones the rest of the country has
decided to use. And even were this not the case, it is difficult to accept
the idea that fundamental values on which all Americans agree can
really differ significantly from place to place. Can the elements of basic human dignity, for example, really mean something very different
to the inhabitants of Ohio and Indiana?276
More importantly, though, discrepancies between the state and
federal constitutions can also be viewed as unintelligible inconsistencies - the same individuals, it seems, have given two different, and
possibly incompatible, accotlnts of the values they hold fundamental.
For example, the national community holds the imposition of cruel
punishments to be morally wrong; 277 this belief defines a people whose
character is such that they recoil at the idea of using torture for any
purpose, no matter how worthy the goal. Suppose the people of a state
adopt a constitution lacking such a provision, or repeal a similar provision in the present state constitution. Can we then say that such a
decision reveals a character that is untroubled by the use of torture?
Such an inference embraces another contradiction: how can the same
person simultaneously have both types of character? Constitutionalism itself rejects such a possibility - if a constitution reflects the character of a people then it cannot simultaneously reflect the opposite of
their character.21s
Furthermore, attempting to salvage the character principle as an
explanation for constitutional differences tends to reduce the concept
of character to triviality. Consider a fairly common instance in which
a state's constitutional law may differ from federal constitutional law
or from the constitutional law of other states. Until 1983, the U.S.
Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment to preclude the
issuance of a search warrant on the tip of an anonymous informant
276. Cf. Project Report, supra note 25, at 277 ("If a coerced confession was repugnant to
human dignity why should it matter which government happened to be exacting it?").
277. See U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII.
278. A dedicated postmodernist might say that I have done nothing more here than describe
the postmodern condition - this is simply how we live our lives, participating in many inconsistent activities and discourses, and that is just the way it is. The postmodern outlook thus deals
with such contradictions not by resolving them but by accepting them as inevitable. For an
interesting response to this view, see ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). In any event, the postmodernist answer does not help here; as a participant
in the discourse, a court is obliged to avoid inconsistencies, or at least the appearance of inconsistency. To embrace inconsistency would be to appear to abandon the ideal of the rule of law, an
act that could have seriously destabilizing ramifications for society.
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unless the warrant application satisfied a two-part test designed to assess the informant's veracity and the basis of the informant's knowledge - the so-called Aguilar-Spinelli test. 219 In Illinois v. Gates, 2 80 the
Court abandoned the two-prong Aguilar-Spinelli test and adopted the
so-called "totality of the circumstances" test, a standard more
favorable to the state. Inevitably, numerous states were asked to apply
parallel provisions of their state constitutions to cases like Gates.
Prosecutors of course argued that the state provisions called for the
totality of the circumstances test, and defendants argued that the earlier Aguilar-Spinelli standard better captured the state's constitutional
standards. Several states reached this issue as a matter ef state constitutional law; some adopted the Gates test and others rejected it. 28 1
Leaving to one side the contradictions pointed out above, it is simply implausible that these different constitutional doctrines can be attributed to differences in the fundamental character and values of the
people of the states. What possible trait of character could cause
someone to prefer a "totality of the circumstances" test for issuing a
search warrant to a two-prong informant reliability test? To say that
"we are a people who use the totality of the circumstances test" is to
speak gibberish; it is like saying "we are a people who eat our stew
with a fork instead of a spoon." Such preferences undoubtedly exist,
but they cannot plausibly be traced to any fundamental value or character trait.
Of course, on some level every difference in personal preference or
behavior must be traceable to some personal trait that differs from the
traits of others who behave differently in similar circumstances; if that
were not the case then everyone would reason and behave identically.
But to call all such variations differences of character would be to reduce the concept of character to triviality: it would account for everything, and thus nothing.
2.

The Dangers of a Robust State Constitutionalism

At this point, the following objection might be raised. These contradictions and implausibilities are interesting, it might be said, but
suppose that the people of a state just do really happen to have a character that differs from the people of other states or of the nation. Sup279. See Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 415-19 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S.
108, 113-15 (1964).
280. 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
281. Compare State v. Arrington, 319 S.E.2d 254, 260-61 (N.C. 1984) (adopting Gates) and
State v. Walter, 670 P.2d 1354, 1358 (Kan. 1983) (same) with State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 143
(Wash. 1984) (rejecting Gates) and State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498, 507-08 (Conn. 1985) (same)
and Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548, 556 (Mass. 1985) (same).
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pose it happens that the inhabitants of a state disagree collectively
with enough aspects of the national Constitution, or disagree so vehemently with a single aspect of the Constitution, that these disagreements can only be understood as reflecting actual differences in
character between the people of the state and the people of the nation.
Wouldn't their constitution, if it embodied these differences, then reflect fundamental differences of character in the way state constitutionalism predicts?
The answer of course is yes, by definition. However, while nothing
makes such a development impossible as a factual matter, it would
pose a problem of some seriousness and potential danger to the people
of the state and of the nation and is thus an inference to be avoided if
possible. Suppose, to return to the previous example, that a refusal to
embrace the totality of the circumstances test somehow indicated a
character fundamentally different from the character that people must
possess in order to be members of the national community. If that
were the case, then it is possible that the community would have to
redefine and reorganize itself, perhaps by casting out the minority who
no longer share the dominant national identity. The world stage today
is filled with nations that are breaking apart, sometimes violently, apparently due to the perception among subgroups that the national
identity is not one in which they can participate - for example,
Croats in Yugoslavia, Lithuanians in the former Soviet Union,
Tibetans in China, Kurds in Iraq, Tamils in Sri Lanka, Sikhs in India,
Quebecois in Canada.
Indeed, the United States itself went through its bloodiest crisis,
the Civil War, as the result of just such a domestic conflict over the
shape of the national character. One's attitude toward slavery is something that can quite plausibly be viewed, and was viewed, as reflecting
a fundamental aspect of character. Once those on each side of the
slavery issue came to view those on the other side as having an identity
incompatible with their own, the stage was set for secession and war.
It can thus be dangerous for the people of a state to say too vehemently and too often, "We are fundamentally different from the rest of
the nation." To talk in that way may be to contribute to conditions
making it difficult for the state to consider itself, and to remain, a part
of the nation. This danger may well account at least in part for state
courts' reluctance to make too much of constitutional differences.
3.

The National Focus on Fundamental Values

If national and state constitutionalism are incompatible - if only
one constitution at a time can ever truly and safely reflect the essential
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character and fundamental values of a people - then one form may
have to yield to the other. The vigor of federal constitutional discourse and the poverty of state constitutional discourse suggest
strongly that this theoretical fault line has shifted in our society, and
that national constitutionalism has prevailed over its state cousin. In
other words, state constitutional variations simply cannot be understood to reflect local variations in character and fundamental values.
But is this really a justifiable conclusion? Isn't it true that
Oregonians have roots in a frontier culture characterized by extreme
individualism, and that Massachusetts society has its roots in Puritanism and social homogenization? And aren't such differences properly
viewed, notwithstanding any danger, as differences in character? I
think not. The tension between state and national constitutionalism
has been largely resolved in the modem day United States by the collapse of meaningful state identity and the coalescence of a social consensus that fundamental values in this country will be debated and
resolved on a national level. Thus, regardless of whether such regional
differences existed in the past, they no longer exist and we may for the
most part disregard them as viable elements of state constitutional
discourse.
First, in the modem world, any serious variations in the character
of the people of individual states must have an extremely short halflife. The national Constitution guarantees a right to travel among the
several states,282 and the ease of mobility and the national structure of
the economy all but guarantee quick dilution of any truly significant
local traits. 283 Indeed, with the help of modem communications technology such dilution can occur without anyone traveling at all. We all
watch the same national news and the same prime-time television
shows; we listen to the same music on the radio; we shop in malls with
the same stores; we eat at the same chain restaurants. It is difficult to
see how any truly fundamental character differences could stand up
against such a cultural assault.
Some might object that these recent developments are irrelevant to
282. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629 (1969).
283. Cf. Pollock, supra note 35, at 986 (arguing that the national economy and mobility
reduce attention to distinct local traits). Perhaps the most dramatic example of this phenomenon
is the popular overturning in Alaska ofRavin v. State, 537 P.2d 494 (Alaska 1975). In that case,
the court relied on the "individuality" and desire for "control over their own lifestyles" of Alas·
kans to strike down a law criminalizing marijuana possession on state constitutional grounds.
537 P.2d at 504. Fifteen years later, the people of the state overturned this decision by ballot
initiative. The 1990 Elections: State by State, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 1990, at BB, B9; see also
Richard Maver, Alaskans to Vote on Marijuana Use, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 1990, at Al7, col. 1.
This suggests that the Alaskan character of rugged individualism did not hold out for long
against the nationwide hardening in attitudes against drug use.
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the interpretation of state constitutions that predate such social
changes. But even if one were inclined to accept the argument that
contemporary attitudes are completely irrelevant to constitutional interpretation,284 a view held in its strict form by virtually no one, 285 the
objection is still unavailing. Most states have adopted their current
constitutions, or so significantly amended them, in comparatively recent times that it is difficult to argue that the constitutions cannot be
read to incorporate attitudes toward nation and state of relatively recent vintage.
Moreover, I think it is fair to say that at this stage in our national
life, Americans tend to focus on and debate issues concerning fundamental values primarily on a national level. 286 In a recent poll, over
half of those surveyed did not even know that their state had its own
constitution. 287 It is difficult to debate an identity expressed in a constitution you do not know exists. Further, national interest and advocacy groups seem to set the agenda of ethical and political issues that
people consider fundamental, and to dominate the ensuing debate.
And the national reach of even local media allows people to debate
these issues with opponents from all parts of the country, not merely
from their own state. The abortion debate illustrates this nicely. A
great many people, even some who are well informed, labor under the
misconception that if the Supreme Court overrules Roe v. Wade, abortion will be illegal; it does not even occur to them that such a ruling
would only shift the debate to state forums.
So accustomed have Americans become to debating fundamental
moral and policy issues on a national level that, paradoxically, state
involvement in such issues can sometimes seem vaguely antidemocratic. For example, you become active in a national issue
group, attend rallies, write your congressional representatives, and
otherwise slug it out with your opponents. Suppose your side wins.
The democratic system has worked, and according to the rules of the
284. Two leading exponents of this view are Raoul Berger and Robert Bork. See RAOUL
BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY (1977); Robert Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First
Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971).
285. Judge Vito Titone of the New York Court of Appeals has argued that a noninterpretive
method of constitutional interpretation is more appropriate for state constitutions than for the
federal Constitution because of the recency and ease of amendment of state documents. Titone,
supra note 215, at 471.
286. See Spaeth, supra note 31, at 736 ("[W]hen we think of our natural rights ... we think
of rights protected by the federal Constitution, not by the constitution of the state where we
happen to live."); Teachout, supra note 28, at 14 ("For most of our history the constitutional law
that has been most important in shaping our culture has been a national constitutional law.").
287. Robert F. Williams & Earl M. Maltz, Introduction, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 877, 878 n.4
(1989) (citing John Kincaid, State Court Protections of Individual Rights Under State Constitutions: The New Judicial Federalism, 61 J. STATE GOVT. 163, 169 (Sept./Oct. 1988)).
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game your opponents must take their lumps and abide by the decision
of the majority - the issue is settled. But when the state chapter of
your group starts sending you urgent notices that your position is
under attack on the state level, you may well feel betrayed; this battle
has been won, and the other side should just go away. Trying to slide
something by on the state level seems like poor sportsmanship, if not
some kind of political dirty trick.
Corresponding to the national focus of the debate on values is the
general absence of public identification with the polity defined by the
state. We have no trappings, no rituals, no conventions that could
serve even to keep the state in our thoughts. How many people, for
instance, own a state flag, or even know what it looks like? How often
do governors make televised addresses to the people of the state? As
Professor Karst has pointed out, "Before the small-town basketball
game begins, the high school band plays 'The Star-Spangled
Banner.' " 288

D.

The Nature of State Constitutional Differences

We have seen that attributing differences among the various state
and federal constitutions to variations in the character of the relevant
polities is contradictory, counterfactual, and potentially dangerous.
Yet state constitutions do differ, and those differences can have significant legal effects. If constitutional differences do not result from local
variations in the character and values of the people, how can we account for them and what interpretation should we give them? The
answer, I suggest, lies in treating character itself as a more complex
phenomenon than proponents of New Federalism are wont to do.
Consider our notion of dissent. Many constitutional decisions of
the U.S. Supreme Court are not unanimous; different Justices have
different views about how the Constitution applies in particular circumstances, which occasionally leads them to dissent. Yet we do not
consider a divided Supreme Court opinion to impugn in the least our
belief in the reality of our nationhood, nor do we attribute such differences in opinion among the Justices to particularized personal attributes that rise to the level of ontological significance. Indeed, to
attribute a dissent to a truly fundamental difference of character between the dissenters and the majority would be to question the extent
to which the dissenters can really be a part of the national community
- it would be, in essence, to question whether they are real Americans. Of course, questioning the Americanism of those with whom we
288. KARST, supra note 268, at 180.
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disagree is unfortunately an all too commonly employed rhetorical device. But responsible people avoid such accusations because of the
danger they pose to the stability and coherence of the national community - we have no real wish to become a people who cast out those
who disagree with the majority.
The idea of dissenting opinions furnishes a useful model for thinking about state constitutional variations. A dissenter in a constitutional case is one who disagrees with the majority about the meaning
of the constitution, yet is nonetheless someone we can still consider to
be a member of society - someone who shares our fundamental sense
of identity and the values that help constitute that identity.289 That
dissenters can exist within a society without significantly disrupting it
reveals an important aspect of communal identity: a community is not
composed of unifopn individuals who share every attitude and value.
Rather, society is textured in an irregular, clumpy way; some people
embrace society's dominant values more firmly than others, or embrace certain values and not others, or hold idiosyncratic views about
what behavior society's values require in certain situations. Yet all
these people may nevertheless share essentially in the communal
identity.
Of course, there are limits to how far any individual can wander
from the mean and still be a person capable of sharing in the communal identity. Those who roam beyond the tolerable boundaries of
communal identity might be people so fundamentally different from
the members of the community that we may justly describe them as
having a different character. But it seems clear that the character of a
workable national community must be sufficiently broad to embrace a
great deal of individual variation.
This notion of clumpy, irregular variations of a single national
character offers a better model of state-to-state differences in the populace than does the notion of fundamental character variations from
subgroup to subgroup. Taken together, the views of all members of
the national community yield a certain national profile. But because
of the irregularity of variations from the national mean, the views of
any given subgroup of the community, such as the people of a state,
might yield a profile somewhat different from the national one. This
does not mean, however, that the people of the state possess a different
character from the people of the nation; it means only that they pos289. See Burt, supra note 264, at 456 (stating that adjudication in a democracy depends on
"an acknowledged common identity that transcends the divisive implications of the immediate
dispute").
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sess the various elements of the national character in slightly different
proportions than does the nation as a whole.
On this view, differences among state constitutions and between
the federal and state constitutions do not reflect the fundamentally distinct choices of fundamentally distinct groups; rather, they reflect the
varied outcomes of constitutional bargaining among essentially similar
subgroups distributed in slightly different proportions within each
state. That is, the subsets of the populace defined by the states, when
given the opportunity to draft their own constitutions, come up with
documents that differ from the national one to the same extent that
views represented on the national level are represented in different proportions within the state. Of course, to take this view is to reject state
constitutionalism as New Federalism conceives it; as explained earlier,
the idea that state constitutions result from political bargaining and
opportunism rather than deliberation and choice is an idea that conflicts with the premises of constitutionalism.
VI.

SOME POSSIBLE REsOLUTIONS

If the assumptions and predictions of state constitutionalism do
not mesh with the realities of national identity, is there any way to
resolve this tension? How, in other words, should we treat state constitutions if the assumptions of constitutionalism do not adequately
describe them? In this Part, I touch briefly on three possible ways out
of the current impasse.
The first solution, and the one most consistent with the tenets of
New Federalism, would be to revise state constitutions to make them
the reflections of the fundamental values and character of the state
polities that constitutionalism says they ought to be - to conform
reality to theory. This would be a task of monumental proportions
and probably quite impossible. It would require at a minimum the
wholesale amendment of state constitutions to eliminate frivolous,
overtly political, and excessively technical provisions that undermine
the sense of seriousness that state constitutions convey. But even
more; it would require a widespread reorientation of attitudes toward
the state. It seems highly unlikely that state constitutions could plausibly be refashioned into true reflections of the character of the people
of th~ state so long as the people continue to identify so little with the
community that the state polity theoretically defines.
The only way out of this dilemma is to convince the people of the
states that they really do constitute unique communities that differ in
fundamental ways from the communities defined by neighboring states
and by the nation. But it is doubtful that such an effort could succeed
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at this point. Americans' identities have drifted so far from association with the states and are so closely woven into a national identity
that the trend seems all but irreversible. Moreover, it is not at all clear
that reorienting attitudes in this way would be ultimately beneficial.
Convincing the people of the states that they constitute unique communities means convincing them that they differ from one another in
significant ways. But convincing them that they are different makes
them so - such a belief takes on a reality by its own force. Unfortunately, fostering the cleavage of society in this way threatens the stability of the national community: if the people of a state embrace aµ
identity that makes them different from the national community, they
may view themselves as too different to remain part of the national
community. As I suggested earlier, this path is potentially dangerous,
and the threat to national stability posed by stressing differences at the
expense of unity seems to· counsel against such an approach to state
constitutionalism.
If conforming reality to theory proves unworkable, a second approach might be to conform theory to reality by abandoning the
strongest claims of state constitutionalism and recognizing that state
constitutions simply do not and perhaps cannot reflect the fundamental values and character of distinct state polities. Such an approach
might require, for example, that a state constitution be treated as a
unique type of document without analogue in our universe of legal
documents; a state constitution might thus be viewed as something less
than a "real" constitution such as the U.S. Constitution, but something more than a statute. Perhaps state constitutional provisions
might be viewed, like statutes, as outcomes of frankly pluralistic power
struggles, but concerning subjects that the polity wants for some reason to remove from the political agenda for some period of time. Indeed, this seems to be the direction in which state supreme courts have
moved; they are generally unwilling to invoke the grandest interpretive strategies of constitutionalism, but are nevertheless forced to treat
constitutional positive law as somehow different from ordinary statutory law. This waffiing helps account for the unsettled and unsettling
status of state constitutional discourse.
The problem with such an approach, however, lies in justifying its
place in a legal system dominated by the conventions of constitutionalism. We seem to lack conventions capable of explaining convincingly
why state constitutions serve any particularly valuable function. Why,
for example, would the people of a state want to elevate some political
decision to constitutional status, thereby placing it beyond the easy
reach of the legislature to alter, if the decision expressed in the provi-
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sion is not one. that the members of the polity consider particularly
fundamental? Seen from the perspective of the· conventions of constitutionalism, such a decision seems odd and perhaps inexplicable.
These conventions tell us, for example, that fundamental things belong
in a constitution and everything else should be a matter of statutory
law. There is nothing wrong with resolving highly important social
issues by statute, nor is a legislature ever forced to tinker with a political compromise worked out in statutory form. The only reason a legislature might want to disturb a .politically sensitive compromise
would be some felt need to adjust it; and the materialization of such a
need would only validate the initial decision to deal with the matter by
statute, since the original solution could be easily reformulated by subsequent legislation rather than by constitutional amendment. Indeed,
the conventions of constitutionalism can make this type of state constitutional law seem downright antidemocratic - a constitutional
amendment becomes a cheap trick pulled by the legislative majority to
elevate a temporary political victory to semipermanent status. 290
What this discussion shows, I think, is that we currently lack a set
of conventions justifying an intermediate place for state constitutional
law and guiding us in its use and interpretation. If we are to clarify
the role of state constitutions enough to make them useful, we need to
develop such conventions. It is quite possible, moreover, that no such
conventions can be developed without amending the political theories
offederalism and constitutionalism from which the extant conventions
are derived. This in turn raises the possibility that the development of
new conventions for the interpretation of state constitutions might
threaten the conventions governing national constitutionalism. Routinely treating state constitutions as reflecting anything less than the
fundamental values and character of the people of the state could
gradually erode the respect - some say reverence - for constitutions
that underlies the significant place of the federal Constitution in our
political system. 291 The threat of such loss of respect may well be
what prevents state supreme courts from frankly abandoning the view
that state constitutions express fundamental values, 292 and leaves them
floundering in the no-man's land of current state constitutional
discourse.
290. See Williams, supra note 34, at 175 (questioning whether state constitutions are "expressions of what is thought to be the best structure of government and statement of people's rights,"
or "instruments oflawmaking through which interest groups ••• seek the grand prize oflawmak·
ing, striving to achieve constitutional status for the policy they advocate").
291. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspectfre, 496 AN·
NALS 33, 35 (1988); KAMMEN, MACHINE, supra note 17; Linde, supra note 5, at 197.
292. See supra note 233 and accompanying text.
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A final way to resolve the conflicts between the theory and practice
of state constitutionalism is sufficiently radical' that I will offer it here
not as a serious proposal, but as a guidepost against which other solutions can be judged. The resolution is this: if Americans really do not
identify in any meaningful way with their state polities, perhaps the
concept of statehood has outlived its usefulness and should be abolished. We might therefore restructure our political institutions to correspond to the communities with which we actually identify. With
what communities do we identify? Clearly Americans identify
strongly with a national community, and a vital role remains for a
constitution national in scope.
But what about identity on a more local level? While I believe that
few Americans identify themselves with a community purporting to
embrace an entire state, I think that most Americans identify themselves rather strongly with a coiµmunity embracing their hometown
and the immediately surrounding area. The thought "we are a people
who ... " seems to have far greater currency when applied to the people of a local community or county than to the people of a state; it
seems more plausible to claim that the people of a major metropolitan
center have a different character from and hold different values than
the people of a rural farming community, even when both communities are in the same state. Yet localities in our system have political
control over comparatively few aspects of daily life.293
Perhaps what needs to be done is to greatly reduce the role of the
states in our political life by redistributing the bulk of state powers
between the national government and some level of local government,
such as the municipal or county level. this could potentially maintain
the significant degree of local control over political decisions that state
government offers, while at the same time adjusting,the level at which
political power is exercised to correspond to the communities with
which ordinary people actually identify.
Of course, the actual distribution of powers between national and
local government might make a tremendous difference in the workability of such a plan. In addition, it is always possible that a new variety of county or local constitutionalism could lead to a degree of
balkanization even less compatible with nationhood than whatever
threat a revitalized state constitutionalism might pose. On the other
hand, such a redistribution, if it worked, could offer substantial social
benefits; perhaps, for example, citizen participation in the political life
of the community might increase if citizens identified more readily and
293. See Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057 (1980).
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personally with ~the government making the decisions that affected
them.
CONCLUSION

Oscar Wilde once wrote: "There is only one thing in the world
worse than being talked about, and that is not being talked about. " 2 94
Wilde's observation has proved true for state constitutions - they are
generally not talked about, but even when they are talked about the
talk is usually garbled or unintelligible. I have argued in this article
that the silence and uneasy confusion surrounding state constitutions
results from our lack of a language in which to speak about them, our
lack of a language in which we can comprehensibly debate their
meaning.
This is indeed a strange state of affairs. State constitutions seem
like important artifacts of our legal system; they are uniformly viewed
by participants in the legal system as authoritative sources of positive
law that state governmental actors must unfailingly obey. How is it
possible that we could lack a useful language in which to speak about
such a prominent feature of the legal landscape? The truth, I suggest,
is that this question is based on false premises.
People develop the languages they need to develop. They do so
when they require a language to help them accomplish some purpose
or goal they have set for themselves. When speaking a language fails
to accomplish a purpose thought to be worth accomplishing, there is
no need to speak it and the language will either disappear or will fail to
emerge in the first place. The absence of a language suitable for debating the meaning of state constitutions - a state constitutional discourse - thus suggests that society has no particular need for such a
language; debating the meaning of a state constitution is not thought
to be an activity particularly worth pursuing. How can this be?
We understand a constitution to be a document that defines a community by identifying its members and by setting out many of their
fundamental choices about the way they want to live their lives. A
language that allows members of a community to debate the meaning
of their constitution allows them to debate their own choices and values, and ultimately their own identity. For a community to lack a
language in which to debate the meaning of its constitution can therefore mean only one of two things: either the community has no need
to debate its identity, or the community that the constitution supposedly defines does not really exist. Human nature itself precludes the
294. OSCAR WILDE, THE PICTURE OF DORIAN GRAY 2 (John Lane 1925).
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first possibility; if discourse creates identity, then no community could
exist for long without developing a need for a language in which to
debate the nature of its identity.295 That leaves the second possibility
- the communities in theory defined by state constitutions simply do
not exist, and debating the meaning of a state constitution does not
involve defining an identity that any group would recognize as its own.
I have argued that this is indeed the case. Americans have a communal identity, but it is a national and not a state identity. We debate
our fundamental values and our identity through constitutional discourse, but we do so on a national level, as a national community.
Residency in one state rather than another is not viewed as an aspect
of individual or group identity, or if it is, it has come to represent
aspects of identity that are not bound up with the types of decisions
that make us who we are in any kind of essential way. As long as this
continues to be the case, state constitutional law is likely to remain
marginal to legal life, and future battles over the nature of the American character and communal identity will have to be fought, like their
predecessors, on a national level in the forum of federal constitutional
law.

295. See WHITE, HERACLES, supra note 14, at 140 ("[T]elling stories about the world and
claiming meanings for them" is "as universal and deeply rooted in human nature" as any "intellectual activity" can be.).

